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Abstract
This thesis addresses the problem of identifying and tracking digital information
that is shared using peer-to-peer file transfer and Voice over IP (VoIP) protocols. The
goal of the research is to develop a system for detecting and tracking the illicit dissem-
ination of sensitive government information using file sharing applications within a
target network, and tracking terrorist cells or criminal organizations that are covertly
communicating using VoIP applications.
A digital forensic tool is developed using an FPGA-based embedded software
application. The tool is designed to process file transfers using the BitTorrent peer-to-
peer protocol and VoIP phone calls made using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).
The tool searches a network for selected peer-to-peer control messages using payload
analysis and compares the unique identifier of the file being shared or phone number
being used against a list of known contraband files or phone numbers. If the identifier
is found on the list, the control packet is added to a log file for later forensic analysis.
Results show that the FPGA tool processes peer-to-peer packets of interest
92% faster than a software-only configuration and is 99.0% accurate at capturing and
processing BitTorrent Handshake messages under a network traffic load of at least 89.6
Mbps. When SIP is added to the system, the probability of intercept for BitTorrent
Handshake messages remains at 99.0% and the probability of intercept for SIP control
packets is 97.6% under a network traffic load of at least 89.6 Mbps, demonstrating that
the tool can be expanded to process additional peer-to-peer protocols with minimal
impact on overall performance.
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An FPGA-Based System for Tracking Digital Information
Transmitted Via Peer-to-Peer Protocols
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networking has changed the way users search for, send, and
receive digital information over the Internet. Instead of relying on interactions with
centralized servers to upload and download digital content, users now share music,
movies, documents, and conversations directly with other users. While peer-to-peer
networking provides new and powerful applications for the legitimate distribution of
digital information, it is also being used for many illicit purposes as well.
One high-profile illicit use of peer-to-peer networking technology is for the dis-
semination of child pornography. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Re-
gional Computer Forensics Laboratory states in its 2007 annual report that “cyber-
crime, which includes crimes against children and child pornography, is the offense for
which law enforcement requested assistance most often” [oJ08]. In addition, a 2005
Government Account Office report stated that “[Peer-to-peer] technology is increas-
ingly popular for disseminating child pornography” [Off05].
Another area in which peer-to-peer networking is being used for illegal activ-
ities is covert communication among terrorist cells through Voice over IP (VoIP)
protocols. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has begun using VoIP-based Internet phones
to coordinate attacks on Coalition forces while avoiding detection. In fact, accord-
ing to one British Government official, VoIP calls are “seriously undermining” MI6’s
ability to intercept and track Taliban communications [Owe08]. In addition, during
the December 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, the attackers’ Pakistan-based
handlers sent instructions, intelligence, and encouragement using VoIP-based Inter-
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net phones [Kah08]. During the 3-day series of attacks, the terrorists were able to
communicate without their calls being traced or intercepted by authorities.
To help combat these illicit uses for peer-to-peer networking, the goal of this
research is to develop a system to identify and track any type of digital informa-
tion that is transmitted on a network using peer-to-peer protocols. Several methods
have already been developed to accomplish this task and are in use today, but they
depend on the use of honeypots to lure targets into downloading contraband mate-
rial [BSCF07], physical access to the suspected file sharer’s computer [AJ07], active
searching of the Internet for contraband files to download [CCM+07], or active in-
terception and modification of contraband file sharing requests [DS08a]. All of these
methods are active attempts to discover illicit file sharing, with the drawback that
they can all be detected and possibly circumvented by file sharers that are aware
of their presence. In contrast, the system developed for this research consists of a
suite of tools that passively detects and tracks illicit file sharing on a target network
without affecting the flow of traffic on the network, making it impossible for users of
the network to determine the presence of the system.
This system is useful for law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and computer
network system administrators across the US Government. Law enforcement agencies
can use these tools to identify child pornography being transmitted across a network
and track both the sender and receiver to their sources. Intelligence agencies can use
the system to track known terrorists using VoIP technology for their communications.
System administrators can also use the tools to detect the unauthorized transmission
of sensitive files from their networks and determine the sender and recipient, thereby
identifying potential insider threats and inadvertent disclosures of sensitive informa-
tion.
1.2 Overview and Goals
This thesis focuses on designing and constructing a digital forensic tool, called
the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer (TRAPP) system, that allows an inves-
2
tigator or system administrator to monitor network traffic in real-time for any digital
information that meets the user’s definition of contraband being shared using peer-
to-peer protocols. The TRAPP system, shown in Figure 1.1, is designed to be set up
on the gateway between a Government-owned network and the Internet. As packets
pass through the gateway, copies are sent to the system for analysis. For each packet
received, TRAPP inspects the packet to determine if it is a control packet for a peer-
to-peer protocol of interest. If the packet is not a peer-to-peer control packet, it is
discarded. If the packet is a control packet, the system extracts from the packet’s
payload the unique identifier for the data being shared, and attempts to match the
identifier against a list of files of interest in the system’s memory. If a match is not
made, the packet is discarded. If a match is made, the control packet is recorded in
a log file for future analysis.
There are three primary goals for this research. The first goal is to construct a
hardware-based system using a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that ana-
lyzes all network traffic sent to it, detects packets belonging to a specific peer-to-peer
protocol, compares the digital information being shared against a list of interest, and
in the case of a match, records selected control packets from the peer-to-peer session
in a log file. The second goal is to optimize the system to increase the probability of
detecting and recording all control packets, even when network traffic is being sent
to the system at nearly the full capacity of the system’s Ethernet controller. The
last goal is to demonstrate the system’s expandability by modifying it to accept an
additional peer-to-peer protocol with no impact on overall performance.
1.3 Thesis Layout
This chapter introduces the research topic, provides a motivation for the re-
search efforts, and outlines the goals of the research. Chapter 2 presents background
information on the types of peer-to-peer networks, related work in the area of detect-
ing illicit file sharing, methods of classifying network traffic, and ways to obfuscate
peer-to-peer traffic. The BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol is discussed in Chapter 3,
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Figure 1.1: The Proposed TRAPP System
and the Session Initiation Protocol is discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 outlines
the methodology used to design, set up, and conduct the experiments to test the
effectiveness of the TRAPP system. Chapter 6 provides a discussion and analysis
of the experimental results. The conclusions drawn from the experimental results,
the significance of the completed TRAPP system, and areas for future research are
given in Chapter 7. Appendix A describes how to construct the hardware portion
of the TRAPP system, and Appendix B contains the raw data collected during the
experiments.
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II. Literature Review and Related Research
This chapter presents an overview of background information and related re-search on peer-to-peer protocols, detection of illicit file sharing, Internet traffic
classification, and peer-to-peer traffic obfuscation techniques. Section 2.1 provides
historical background on several popular peer-to-peer network protocols. Related
research in the area of identifying and tracking illegal file downloaders is presented
in Section 2.2. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 detail traditional methods and recent work on
nontraditional methods of classifying Internet traffic. Section 2.5 outlines the cur-
rent methods of obfuscating and encrypting peer-to-peer traffic, and the chapter is
summarized in Section 2.6.
2.1 Background On the Use of Peer-to-Peer Traffic
Prior to 1999, the Internet was primarily used for World Wide Web surfing,
email, and FTP file transfers [The06]. Then, a new method of transferring files quickly
and easily, called peer-to-peer networking, was introduced. Since then, peer-to-peer
networking has steadily grown in popularity and is now the dominant component of
worldwide Internet traffic [P2P07]. Described below is a short history of the rise of
peer-to-peer networking followed by some statistics on the use of peer-to-peer net-
working on the Internet.
2.1.1 The Rise and Fall of Napster. The first widely used peer-to-peer
networking service was Napster, which was created by Shawn Fanning in 1999 for
the purpose of sharing .mp3 music files [Tys08]. In the Napster architecture, users
download the Napster client, install it, and then connect to centralized servers, run
by the Napster Corporation. These servers contain a constantly-updated list of all
files currently available on client computers. When a user wants to download a file,
he queries the server for IP addresses of other peers who possess the file, and then
connects directly with a peer for the file transfer [Tys08].
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Figure 2.1: How to Download a File Using the Napster Network
Figure 2.1 shows how the Napster system is used to download a file. As shown
in the figure, when downloading a file, the following occurs:
1. The client connects to the central cluster of Napster servers to search for a file
to download.
2. While the client is connected to the server, the server in return searches the
client for sharable files, and the client’s file directory is added to the server’s
list.
3. The server searches its indexes for files matching the client’s request. These
indexes are compiled by querying clients currently connected to the server and
retrieving their file directories.
4. The Napster server sends the client a list of peers who have the file.
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5. The client connects to the peer that has the file and downloads it. Note that
this exchange happens without the server in the loop [Fel04].
While the Napster servers did not contain any illegal or copyrighted files, the
corporation did suffer from a serious legal vulnerability. Even though Napster did not
directly provide illegal files to clients, it did keep centralized records, under its control,
of every file being transferred. The Recording Industry Association of America and
the major music labels sued Napster, claiming that it allowed illegal activities to occur
with its full knowledge and consent. These lawsuits resulted in the closure of Napster
in 2001 [Fel04].
2.1.2 The Rise of Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Systems. In order to avoid the
legal pitfall that befell the Napster system, almost all newer peer-to-peer protocols
eliminate the centralized server model in favor of a decentralized model using super-
peers or supernodes. For example, in the Fast Track/KaZaA protocol, certain clients
are designated as supernodes or superpeers, and are responsible for maintaining and
distributing searchable lists of files. Every client possesses the software to become a
supernode, and any client can be promoted to a superpeer at any time. This allows
the corporations distributing the software to avoid lawsuits, since they now have no
knowledge of what is being shared; that information resides on the supernodes, which
are not under the control of the corporation [Fel04].
In another implementation of decentralized peer-to-peer networking, the Gnutella
protocol uses query flooding to search for and download files. Figure 2.2 shows how
the Gnutella system is used to download a file [The08]. As shown in the figure, when
downloading a file, the following occurs:
1. When a client wishes to search for a file, he sends the query to a small number
of other clients he is connected to (usually less than five), asking for a file.
2. Each of those clients then sends the query to the peers that it is connected to,
and so on, up to a maximum number of hops away from the original requester.
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Figure 2.2: How to Download a File Using the Gnutella Network
3. If another client has the file, it sends a positive reply back to the requester using
the reverse of the route used by the requester’s query.
4. A direct connection is set up between the requester and the client containing
the requested file, and the file is transferred using the HTTP protocol.
For this research, the focus is on the BitTorrent protocol, another decentralized
peer-to-peer protocol, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
2.1.3 Statistics on P2P Traffic Usage on the Internet. The use of the In-
ternet for peer-to-peer file sharing has steadily increased since the introduction of
the Napster protocol in 1999. In 2000, a University of Wisconsin study found that
Napster traffic had supplanted HTTP traffic as the dominant protocol in use on the
university’s network [Plo00]. In 2002, the University of Washington determined that
peer-to-peer traffic accounted for 43% of all university traffic, with only 14% of traffic
devoted to HTTP [SGD+02]. In a 2007 study, Ipoque, a German-based company
8
Figure 2.3: Peer-to-peer Networking as a Percentage of Total Internet Traffic
[The06]
that specializes in network management for Internet service providers, determined
that between 49 and 83 percent of all Internet traffic is peer-to-peer-related [P2P07].
In January 2006, Cachelogic performed a study that showed approximately 61% of
all Internet traffic is peer-to-peer related, compared to only 32% for HTTP [The06].
Figure 2.3 graphically shows this massive increase in the use of peer-to-peer network-
ing. To put this into perspective, a survey conducted in 2005 found that peer-to-peer
networks worldwide contained over 2.8 billion files available for download [CCM+07].
2.2 Current Methods of Identifying Downloaders of Illegal Files
Given the rapid rise of peer-to-peer file sharing, law enforcement agencies and
copyright holders are struggling to keep up with illegal file sharers. Currently, there
are several methods available to these entities to identify and track illegal file down-
loaders. These methods include the use of honeypots to lure suspects into download-
ing illegal files provided as bait by law enforcement, physically searching a suspect’s
computer for illegal files that have been downloaded in the past, identifying illegal
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downloads on BitTorrent through the exhaustive search of files available for download,
and a new method of active interception and modification of contraband file sharing
requests.
2.2.1 Honeypots. One simple method of identifying and tracking uploaders
and downloaders of contraband files is through the use of honeypots. In the context
of this discussion, a honeypot is a trap designed to detect and track illegal activities.
In its most basic execution, a computer is set up on the Internet with a collection of
illegal files. These files are then advertised on various peer-to-peer networks, where
they await downloading by illegal file sharers. When another computer attempts to
download the illegal files, the downloader’s IP address, port number, date, time, and
the packets being downloaded are recorded by the honeypot owner. This information
is then either sent to law enforcement agencies for prosecution or used as evidence in
civil lawsuits brought by the owners of the files being downloaded.
In their research, Badonnel, State, Christment, and Festor design and test a
management platform for tracking illegal file sharers using peer-to-peer networks
[BSCF07]. Their platform contains a configurable honeypot agent that is “capable
of advertising parameterizable undesirable content and of identifying cyberpredators
that request those contents.” To create and track these agents, they also create a
separate “platform manager” that configures the honeypot agents and organizes the
resulting data, including the list of illegal file downloaders that the agents have de-
tected and tracked. A custom network protocol is used for communication between
the agents and the manager.
Figure 2.4 shows how the agents and management platform interact to perform
this detection and tracking. To successfully capture a cyberpredator, the system
performs the following functions [BSCF07]:
1. Set Configuration. The platform manager configures the honeypot agent. When
the manager first deploys the honeypot agents, it provides those agents with the
list of keywords used to generate the bait files, along with a set of rules for how
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Figure 2.4: How Honeypot Agents and the Platform Manager Interact to Detect
and Track Illegal File Downloaders (Adapted from [BSCF07])
the files will be generated and the content of the files. The manager also provides
the initial set of rules that the agent will employ in its local statistical analysis
of downloading activity.
2. Generation of Fake Files. The proper generation of file names by the honeypot
agent is extremely important to the effectiveness of the honeypot. To generate
the fake illegal files, the agent is given a list of keywords common to the types
of files being offered. The agent then randomly generates file names using
combinations of the keywords and attaches extensions corresponding to the
most common formats of illegally download files, such as audio, picture, and
video file types.
3. Capture of File Requests. The honeypot agent must accurately detect, identify,
and record all attempts to download the illegal files that it generated in the
step above. The agent is capable of analyzing all inbound traffic and identifying
sessions using a peer-to-peer protocol. Once the sessions are identified, the agent
records the files being downloaded as well as the identifying information of the
downloader, such as IP address and port number.
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4. Local Statistical Analysis. The honeypot agent performs a statistical analysis
of the data collected, and identifies information such as the most requested file
keywords and the most active downloaders. The agent uses these results to
determine potential patterns of downloading by certain users and to refine the
generation of file names for future download.
5. Get Management Data. The platform manager gets management data from
the honeypot agent. The manager uses the custom platform communication
protocol to retrieve the results of the local statistical analyses from the honeypot
agents. These results include the list of most request files, most searched for
keywords, and the most active downloaders from the agent’s local perspective.
These results are organized and stored in a database for further analysis.
6. Statistical Analysis. The platform manager performs its own statistical analysis.
The manager takes the local statistical data from all the honeypot agents and
performs a platform-wide statistical analysis on the data. This integrated anal-
ysis allows the manager to identify illegal file downloaders that initially escape
notice by the local agents because of their downloading patterns. In addition,
the analysis also provides the manager with data on what keywords are most of-
ten searched for platform-wide, which is then used to update the file generation
keyword lists that are provided to individual honeypot agents.
2.2.1.1 Shortcomings of the Honeypot Method. While effective against
illegal downloaders who access the honeypots, there are several shortcomings to using
this method for identifying and tracking illegal downloaders.
First, the illegal downloader has to access the honeypot. While a seemingly
trivial problem, the advent of IP blacklists among the downloading community has
dealt a major setback to the honeypot method. An IP blacklist is a list of IP addresses
that are known or suspected to be used by government authorities and corporations
as sources of honeypots to trap and track downloaders. Today, programs such as Peer
Guardian are specifically designed to act as a downloading firewall that blocks these
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blacklisted IP addresses, preventing the user’s peer-to-peer software from downloading
from them [Gil08].
Second, honeypots are an active method of detection, in that file sharers must
actively download from the honeypot in order to be identified by law enforcement
agencies. For certain classes of highly illegal files, such as child pornography, hard
to find and private invite-only websites are used to keep the general public and law
enforcement from accessing and downloading them [Mac06]. It is very difficult for
honeypots to become registered peers on these private sites, further decreasing their
usefulness.
2.2.2 Hardware Recovery of Illegal Files. Another method of identifying
potential illegal file downloaders is to search the suspect’s computer for illegally down-
loaded files using digital forensic techniques. In their research, Adelstein and Joyce
introduce a digital forensic tool called File Marshal which allows law enforcement to
automatically detect and analyze peer-to-peer software usage on a hard drive [AJ07].
Figure 2.5 shows the four phases used by the File Marshal software to recover peer-
to-peer usage data [AJ07].
2.2.2.1 Discovery Phase. In the discovery phase, the File Marshal
software analyzes the target hard drive and searches for any peer-to-peer client soft-
ware that is currently or was previously installed. By searching for telltale signs
of peer-to-peer software in the system registry, file system directory structure, path
statements, and data directories, the software can identify what peer-to-peer software
has been used on the computer, even programs that were uninstalled prior to the
search.
2.2.2.2 Acquisition Phase. In the acquisition phase, the software re-
trieves all configuration and log information from the peer-to-peer software applica-
tions. These configuration and log files contain useful information such as the names
of downloaded files, when the files were downloaded, what servers the peer-to-peer
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Figure 2.5: The File Marshal Forensic Software Investigation Process [AJ07]
client has connected to in the past, and lists of hashes for files that have been uploaded
and downloaded.
2.2.2.3 Analysis Phase. In the analysis phase, the software repackages
the information retrieved in the acquisition phase into a format that is easily read and
manipulated by the forensic investigator. File Marshal allows the investigator to view
downloaded files, sort lists by various parameters, and search for files by providing
certain criteria, such as a specific hash value.
2.2.2.4 Report Generation Phase. The last phase, report generation,
involves the software providing an audit trail of every step taken by the forensic
investigator and by the File Marshal tool for authentication and verification purposes.
The software also creates summary reports that can easily be imported into a larger
forensic report.
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2.2.2.5 Shortcomings of the Hardware Recovery Method. As with
the use of honeypots, there are several drawbacks to the hardware recovery method.
First, the investigator must physically possess the hard drive. In most cases, this
requires some kind of legal action to force a suspect to turn over his computer to the
investigator, which can be an extremely invasive procedure.
Second, in order to recover a suspect’s hard drive for analysis, investigators must
first determine that the hard drive is worth analyzing. In other words, investigators
must already suspect the computer as containing illegal files before acting to confiscate
the drive for analysis. This type of investigation is extremely time and labor intensive,
limiting the ability of law enforcement to tackle widespread illegal file sharing using
this method.
2.2.3 The BitTorrent Monitoring System. A specialized method for detect-
ing and tracking illegal file downloaders is the BitTorrent Monitoring (BTM) system,
designed by Chow, et. al. [CCM+07]. BTM is a system that automatically searches
the Internet for BitTorrent-based downloadable files, analyzes the files to determine
if they are illegal, attempts to download the suspected illegal files, and finally records
tracking information on who provided the files for download. For more information
on the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol, see Chapter 3.
Figure 2.6 shows how the BitTorrent Monitoring system works. The system is
divided into two modules, the torrent file searcher (steps 1 and 2 in Figure 2.6) and
the torrent file analyzer (steps 3 through 5) [CCM+07].
2.2.3.1 Torrent File Searching. To gather torrents for download and
analysis, the investigator seeds the BTM with a list of websites that are known or
suspected to contain torrents of illegal files. BTM then performs a depth first search
(DFS) beginning with each seed website on the list and linking to a predetermined
number of hyperlinks away from that seed site. At each site it encounters, BTM
downloads all the .torrent files contained on the webpage and stores them on the
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Figure 2.6: The BitTorrent Monitoring System Process [CCM+07]
investigator’s computer. These searches can be automatically performed periodically
according to any time interval set by the investigator.
2.2.3.2 Torrent File Analyzer. Once a group of torrents is downloaded,
the file searcher module hands the list off to the file analyzer module. The analyzer
module then compares each .torrent file against a predetermined set of rules that will
identify the file as potentially illegal. These rules include such attributes as name,
country of origin, creation date, and number of seeders.
If the torrent meets the criteria set down by the rules engine, the module then
contacts each peer contained in the file and attempts to download the suspected
illegal file. The results of each attempt are recorded by the module, and are then
compiled into a series of reports that are output to the investigator. At the completion
of the process, the investigator has information on what torrents were downloaded,
which of them were determined by the rules engine as potentially illegal, and tracking
information on the peers who provided BTM with the files.
2.2.3.3 Shortcomings of the BTM System. BTM has the potential to
become a powerful law enforcement tool in combating illegal file sharing. However,
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there are two main drawbacks to the system. First, due to the sheer number of torrent
files that are available on most torrent websites, the BTM system currently suffers
from a very slow processing time. As the number of sublevels covered by the DFS
increases, the number of total torrent files to be analyzed increases exponentially,
leading to a drastically reduced total processing time.
Second, the BTM system cannot run in real time. As stated above, BTM relies
on the torrent file for generating its list of peers to connect to. However, the actual
peers that are serving the file for download are constantly changing, with peers being
added and deleted continuously. The peer list downloaded from the tracker server
only provides a snapshot of active peers, which quickly becomes outdated, limiting
its use by BTM. In addition, because the BTM system downloads contraband files
to track illicit file sharers, the investigator must ensure that he has the proper legal
authority to download the illicit files.
2.2.4 The CopyRouter Peer-to-Peer Tracking System. In October 2008,
MSNBC reported that an Australian company, Brilliant Digital Entertainment Ltd.,
was marketing a new Internet monitoring tool known as CopyRouter [DS08a]. As
described by Brilliant Digital Entertainment, the CopyRouter system inspects every
packet entering or leaving a target network, looks for peer-to-peer search results that
reference files that are on a known contraband list (such as child pornography, the
stated primary application of the system), and replaces the illicit file reference with
one that leads the user to a law enforcement server instead [DS08b].
Figure 2.7 shows how the CopyRouter system works [DS08b]. When a user
inside a network being monitored by CopyRouter attempts to download a file:
1. The user’s peer-to-peer client sends a file request to other peer-to-peer clients
outside the network on the Internet. CopyRouter does not inspect or modify
this search request.
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Figure 2.7: How the CopyRouter System Works
2. When an outside peer-to-peer client finds the file, it sends a response to the
user indicating that it has the file. This response is intercepted by CopyRouter
system, and the hash value of the file described in the response is compared to
an internal list of hashes called the Global File Registry (GFR). If the hash value
does not match an entry in the GFR, it is passed along without modification.
3. If the file hash of the response matches an entry in the GFR, CopyRouter
changes the hash value and the IP address of the client where the file can
be found. The IP address is changed to the address of the law enforcement
content server and the hash value is changed to match an image file on the
law enforcement server notifying the user of the infringement. The modified
response is then forwarded to the user.
4. When the user attempts to download the illicit file, he is redirected to the law
enforcement content server.
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5. The law enforcement content server then sends the user the infringement notice
instead of the illicit file.
6. A copy of the original peer-to-peer client response message as well as the mod-
ified response message are recorded on a law enforcement log server for further
analysis.
Some descriptions of the CopyRouter system claim that it can also hash images,
audio files, and video files in real time and compare those files against the GFR
[DS08a]. If true, the system may also be used to scan email attachments, HTTP
sessions, and FTP transfers in real time.
2.2.4.1 Shortcomings of the CopyRouter System. While the Copy-
Router system seems like an effective child pornography tracking system, there are
several lingering questions surrounding its implementation. First, CopyRouter is a
proprietary system, and to date, Brilliant Digital Entertainment has yet to release
any specifications or experimental data on the system’s speed, effectiveness, or ability
to process all packets at full network speed.
Second, while seemingly effective for peer-to-peer systems where only one up-
loader is involved, such as Gnutella, the system’s ability to monitor distributed peer-
to-peer systems such as BitTorrent is questionable. As discussed in Chapter 3, as a
BitTorrent client downloads pieces of the file from peers, each piece is hashed and
compared against the .torrent file. If the hashes do not match, which is always the
case when the user downloads from the law enforcement content server, the piece is
simply discarded.
Finally, CopyRouter is an active detection and tracking system, meaning that
each packet entering or leaving the network is read and possibly modified before being
allowed to continue through the gateway. One consequence of this is that the system’s
presence can theoretically be detected by users with enough knowledge of how the
system works. These users can then modify their behavior and simply not use the
monitored network to share illicit information.
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2.3 Traditional Methods for Classifying Network Traffic
One major component of this research is analyzing network traffic in real time
in order to identify packets used by peer-to-peer protocols. Currently, there are three
accepted traditional methods of performing classification analysis on network traffic.
Port matching involves comparing the traffic’s source and destination port against a
list of known port numbers in an attempt to match the traffic to a protocol. Payload
analysis analyzes the first portion of a packet’s payload and attempts to match these
byte strings to a specific protocol. Finally, transport level identification uses network
flow characteristics to identify the protocol being used without payload analysis or
port matching, where a “network flow” is defined as a series of packets flowing on a
network that all contain the same 5-tuple of (source IP address, source port number,
destination IP address, destination port number, protocol used) [CGD07].
2.3.1 Socket-Layer / Port Matching. The simplest and earliest used method
of identifying protocols used by Internet traffic is port matching. In port matching,
the network traffic analyzer extracts the source and destination transport layer port
numbers from each packet, then compares the port numbers against a table containing
a list of peer-to-peer protocols and their corresponding ports. Table 2.1 contains the
TCP port numbers for commonly used peer-to-peer protocols.
Table 2.1: Common TCP Port Numbers Used by P2P Applications [Spe08]
P2P Protocol TCP Port Numbers
eDonkey2000 4661-4665
FastTrack / KaZaA 1214
BitTorrent 6881-6889
Gnutella 6346-6347
Napster 6699
MP2P 41170 UDP
Direct Connect 411-412
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2.3.1.1 Advantages of Port Matching. The main advantage of classify-
ing Internet traffic by port matching is its simplicity and speed. In port matching, the
only piece of information used to classify the traffic is the port number from the TCP
header, which makes packet analysis extremely simple. The simplicity of extracting
the port number, combined with the ease of comparing the number against a list of
protocols, results in very fast analysis of packets.
2.3.1.2 Drawbacks of Port Matching. In spite of these advantages, port
matching is no longer used as an effective Internet classification method. First, most
peer-to-peer protocols do not register their port numbers with the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA). As a result, the IANA cannot accurately track the port
numbers used by these applications and make them available to classification software
developers.
Second, some peer-to-peer protocols use the same port numbers as other, more
well known, applications such as HTTP on Port 80 [Gon05]. This dual-use of well
known ports confuse classification software, resulting in an increased number of false
negatives when attempting to detect peer-to-peer traffic.
Finally, most peer-to-peer applications allow their users to manually set the
port number used by the client. In addition, if the port is not manually specified,
newer peer-to-peer clients will instead assign a random port number. In either case,
attempting to compare these non-standard port numbers against a static list is futile
at best [Gon05]. This weakness is reinforced by a research study in 2005 by Madhukar
and Williamson that determined up to 70% of Internet traffic is unclassifiable by
straight port matching [MW06].
2.3.2 Application-Layer / Payload Analysis. Another traditional method
of identifying Internet traffic by protocol is analyzing the payloads of the packet
stream and searching for telltale byte streams that correspond to a specific protocol.
In their research, Sen, Spatscheck, and Wang develop a system to quickly identify
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packet streams using peer-to-peer protocols by analyzing the first few bytes of the
packet payloads [SSW04]. Listed below are identifying features they used to detect
five major peer-to-peer protocols by payload.
2.3.2.1 The Gnutella Protocol. The Gnutella protocol uses a series of
HTTP-like commands to request files and reply to file requests. When attempting
to establish a connection, the requester sends the following as the payload of a TCP
packet:
GNUTELLA CONNECT/<protocol version string>\n\n
The affirmative response to the request for a connection uses the following for-
mat:
GNUTELLA OK\n\n
Based on these observations, Sen, et. al. recommend searching for the string
GNUTELLA immediately following the TCP/IP header to identify Gnutella traffic.
2.3.2.2 The eDonkey Protocol. The eDonkey protocol uses a common
header for both file requests and responses. The header is composed of 5 bytes, where
the first byte is a marker byte of value 0xe3, and the next 4 bytes are a number that
represents the size of the entire packet minus the TCP/IP headers and the 5-byte
header. Sen, et. al. recommend using these 5 bytes to identify eDonkey traffic.
2.3.2.3 The Direct Connect Protocol. The Direct Connect protocol is
composed of a series of commands that are used by both the file requester and file
provider, and always follows the following format:
$command_type message1 message2 message 3 ... |
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All of the commands in Direct Connect begin with the $ character and end
with the | character. Some examples of messages sent within these commands are
Hello, ConnectToMe, Search, and Quit. Sen, et. al. recommend using these
beginning and ending characters as a preliminary filter for Direct Connect traffic.
2.3.2.4 The KaZaA Protocol. The KaZaA protocol, like the Gnutella
protocol, uses HTTP-like commands to request files. The HTTP format for a file
request contains the following fields:
GET /.files HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: <IP address>/<port>\r\n
UserAgent: KazaaClient\r\n
X-Kazaa-Username: \r\n
X-Kazaa-IP: \r\n
X-Kazaa-SupernodeIP: \r\n
The receiver then sends the following back to the requester:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n
Content-Length: \r\n
Server: KazaaClient \r\n
X-Kazaa-Username: \r\n
X-Kazaa-Network: \r\n
X-Kazaa-IP: \r\n
X-Kazaa-SupernodeIP: \r\n
Content Type: \r\n
To identify KaZaA traffic, Sen, et. al. recommend searching for the string GET
or HTTP immediately following the TCP/IP header, and then searching the remainder
of the packet for a field containing the string X-Kazaa.
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2.3.2.5 The BitTorrent Protocol. Finally, in the BitTorrent protocol,
clients establish a connection with each other through a unique handshake followed
by a continuous stream of data. For the connection handshake, the requester and
provider both send packets that share a common header of the form:
0x13 <The 19 byte string: "BitTorrent Protocol">
This header is simply one byte that represents the decimal number 19 in hex-
adecimal followed by a 19-byte string that represents the phrase “BitTorrent Proto-
col”. Sen, et. al. recommend searching for this 20-byte string immediately following
the TCP/IP header to identify BitTorrent traffic.
2.3.2.6 Advantages of Payload Analysis. There are several advan-
tages to using payload analysis for detecting peer-to-peer traffic. First, due to the
uniqueness of the payload message headers, payload analysis is very accurate. Sec-
ond, because accurate identification only requires the analysis of the first 5 to 20 bytes
of the payload, identification can be performed very quickly. In their research, Sen,
Spatscheck, and Wang were able to identify peer-to-peer connections in less than 10
packets with less than 5% false positive and false negative rates [SSW04].
2.3.2.7 Drawbacks of Payload Analysis. There are also some draw-
backs to using payload-based identification of traffic. First, some protocols such as
Gnutella are completely open source, which enables third parties to easily modify the
protocol for their specific client software. These differing implementations can cause
false negatives if the header byte format is changed from the standard implementation
of the protocol. Conversely, other protocols such as KaZaA are proprietary, which
results in a homogeneous implementation by clients but also limits, or eliminates, the
availability of the protocol specification to construct the detection rules from.
Second, payload analysis is vulnerable to obfuscation through the use of byte
padding, which adds random characters to the beginning of the payload in order
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to move the message headers deeper into the payload, thereby avoiding detection.
Byte padding is discussed further in Section 2.5.1. In addition, if the payloads are
encrypted, payload analysis is not feasible. Payload encryption is discussed further
in Section 2.5.2.
2.3.3 Transport-Layer / Statistical Identification and Analysis. In their re-
search, Karagiannis, Broido, Faloutsos, and Claffy introduce a method of identifying
peer-to-peer traffic by analyzing the connection patterns of various peer-to-peer net-
works [KBFC04]. Introduced in 2004, this method quickly gained acceptance as a new
standard for identifying peer-to-peer traffic within large networks. By observing the
connection patterns of the source and destination IP addresses during a peer-to-peer
file exchange, the researchers were able to design two heuristics that can be used to
identify peer-to-peer traffic solely from these connection patterns.
2.3.3.1 Heuristic Using TCP/UDP IP Pairs. The first heuristic
searches for IP address pairs that exchange information using both TCP and UDP.
The researchers found that many peer-to-peer protocols such as Gnutella, eDonkey,
FastTrack, and Direct Connect use UDP for exchanging control and management in-
formation and TCP for the actual file transfers. However, other common protocols
such as DNS, NETBIOS, and IRC use the same combination of TCP and UDP. Since
these applications use well defined port numbers, the heuristic simply ignores traffic
from these ports to reduce the number of false positives.
By looking for IP address pairs that exchange information using both TCP
and UDP, and ignoring traffic using port numbers that correspond to non-peer-to-
peer protocols, the heuristic is able to identify peer-to-peer traffic flows with great
accuracy when combined with the second heuristic described below.
2.3.3.2 Heuristic Using (IP, port) Pairs. The other heuristic designed
by the researchers is based on evaluating the pattern of connections between source
and destination (IP address, port number) pairs. As discussed previously, in a decen-
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tralized peer-to-peer network, each client possesses a host cache which contains the
addresses of several superpeers, which allows an initial connection into the network.
When the superpeer receives the connection request from the client, it forwards the
client’s (IP, port) pair to other peers within the network, who then establish connec-
tions with the client.
Because the client’s listening port number is selected randomly, the superpeer
must forward both the IP address and the listening port number to the peers for
them to facilitate a direct connection. So, each time a peer connects to the client, a
network flow is created with the client’s (IP, port) pair as one end of the connection.
The researcher’s heuristic takes advantage of this fact by searching network traffic for
a series of connection to a specific (IP, port) pair from many other unique (IP, port)
pairs.
By looking for network flows that involve many sources connecting to a single
destination (IP, port) pair, this heuristic, when combined with the TCP/UDP pair
heuristic, is able to identify peer-to-peer traffic flow with over 95% accuracy [KBFC04].
2.3.3.3 Advantages of Transport Layer Identification of Peer-to-Peer
Traffic. There are several advantages to using transport layer identification to
detect peer-to-peer networking flows. First, because the two heuristics only depend
on a 5-tuple of (source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, transport
layer protocol), the identification algorithm can analyze network traffic very quickly,
allowing for real time analysis of network backbone traffic. Second, because the
heuristics are based on the connection patterns only, the algorithm can detect peer-
to-peer traffic using modified or previously unknown protocols.
2.3.3.4 Drawbacks to Transport Layer Identification. There are also
several drawbacks to this method of identifying peer-to-peer traffic flows. First, and
most significantly, this method cannot identify the specific peer-to-peer protocol being
used, nor can it identify what is being sent. Second, while this method is able to iden-
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tify greater than 95% of all peer-to-peer communication, the false positive rate ranges
from 8% to 12% [KBFC04]. This high rate may limit its usefulness to Internet service
providers seeking to block or shape peer-to-peer traffic, as they would inadvertently
block a sizeable percentage of legitimate traffic as well.
2.4 Non-Traditional Methods for Classifying Network Traffic
In the field of network traffic classification, research is continually being per-
formed in the search for newer, more effective methods of classifying Internet traffic
by protocol. Discussed below are a sampling of non-traditional methods for iden-
tifying network traffic protocols that use Markovian signatures, the discreteness of
remote hosts, clustering algorithms, and flow records.
2.4.1 Markovian Signature-Based Classification. In their research, Dah-
mouni, Vaton, and Rosse describe a real-time method of classifying network traffic
by application protocol using a Markovian signature-based approach [DVR07]. They
constructed a two part process that enumerates Markov chains that represent the
packet flows contained in each target application protocol, and then compares incom-
ing traffic against the Markov chains to find a match.
In the first part of the classification algorithm, a Markov chain is constructed
for each application protocol for which the user wishes to identify traffic. Then, based
on a training dataset which contains sample network flows using the protocols, the
state transition probabilities for each application are created and stored. These state
transition probabilities represent the probabilities of transitioning from one packet
format used by the protocol to another packet format (e.g., a GNUTELLA CONNECT
message from a host followed by a GET /get command message from the host once
the connection is confirmed).
In the second part of the algorithm, the Maximum Likelihood theory and the
Neyman-Pearson theory are applied to the incoming network traffic and the Markov
chains to decide if the traffic matches an application’s Markov model [DVR07]. The
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algorithm computes the likelihood value for each Markov model against the unknown
traffic flow, and the Markov model with the highest computed likelihood value is
assigned to the flow. Although Dahmouni, et. al. only focused on the HTTP, HTTPS,
and telnet protocols in their research, the method can be expanded to include peer-
to-peer networking applications [DVR07].
2.4.2 Discreteness of Remote Hosts. In their research, Cheng, Gong, and
Ding present a new methodology for identifying BitTorrent-like traffic using what
they term the “Discreteness of Remote Hosts (RHD)” [CGD07]. RHD takes the
total number of concurrent network traffic flows into a specific host (IP address,
port number) pair, and measures how much the flows are spread out among differing
subnetworks and remote hosts. A high RHD indicates that the concurrent network
flows into a host are spread among many different remote networks, indicating that
the flows are most likely part of a BitTorrent file transfer. A low RHD indicates that
the concurrent network flows are concentrated among few remote networks, indicating
a client-server interaction such as an HTTP or an FTP session.
As previously stated in Section 2.3.3, the BitTorrent protocol relies on multiple
peers all connecting to the same host (IP address, port number) in order to download
files. The RHD algorithm takes advantage of this fact by giving a numerical mea-
surement to how discrete the concurrent network flows are; if the RHD measurement
passes a predefined threshold, the flow is labeled as a BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer
session. The RHD method of classifying BitTorrent-like traffic returned an accuracy
of better than 90%, on average [CGD07].
2.4.3 Clustering Algorithms. In their research, Erman, Arlitt, and Mahanti
develop a classification process that relies on using a clustering algorithm to group
network flows by protocol used [EAM06]. The clustering algorithm computes the Eu-
clidian distance between pairs of network connections, where each network connection
is defined as a packet flow between two hosts. Each packet flow consists of the number
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of packets in the flow, the mean packet size, the mean payload size, the total number
of bytes transferred, and the mean inter-arrival time of the packets.
The classification process is composed of two parts. First, an unsupervised
clustering algorithm such as K-Means (which partitions objects into K subsets based
on squared-error calculation for each object) or DBSCAN (which assigns objects to
clusters based on the density of other objects in its immediate vicinity) is applied to a
set of test data in order to build and accurately label a set of clusters, which becomes
the classification model. Second, the model is used to build a classifier tool, which
the researchers have not yet constructed, that can label network traffic either oﬄine,
using packet capture files, or in real time on a live network.
The researchers note that this classification technique is still in the developmen-
tal stage. However, even with this limitation, they are still able to correctly classify
Internet traffic with an accuracy of approximately 80% [EAM06].
2.4.4 Flow Records. In their research, Karagiannis, Papagiannaki, and
Faloutsos outline a novel approach to the traffic classification problem that they term
BLINd Classification (BLINC) [KPF05]. This classification framework attempts to
characterize network flows on three levels: The social level, the functional level, and
the application level. By combining data gleaned from each of these levels, an accurate
identification of the network flow can be made.
2.4.4.1 The Social Level. At the social level, BLINC measures the
popularity of each host in the network by measuring the number of other hosts it
communicates with. As shown in Figure 2.8, the BLINC system analyzes the source
and destination IP addresses of each packet flowing through the network, and groups
them together to form bipartite clusters of hosts. By analyzing these graphs using
various cross-association algorithms, BLINC can determine the diversity of the con-
nections made to and from each host, and then identify the popularity of each host
and frequency of communications between hosts.
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Figure 2.8: Example of a Bipartite Cluster of Network Hosts [KPF05]
2.4.4.2 The Functional Level. At the functional level, BLINC uses
connection information to determine the function of each host on the network, such as
a server, consumer, or collaborator. For example, a host that receives many incoming
connections on one listening port is most likely a server of information to various
consumers. For this analysis, BLINC looks at the source and destination IP addresses,
as well as the source port number for each packet.
2.4.4.3 The Application Level. At the application level, BLINC looks
at the transport layer interactions between hosts in an attempt to determine what
applications are being used for the packet flows. After examining the source and
destination IP addresses, as well as the source and destination port numbers, BLINC
constructs a graphlet, which is a pattern of behavior for a given network flow. Fig-
ure 2.9 shows examples of these graphlets for some common applications found on
the Internet. In each graphlet, the relationship between the source and destination
IP addresses, shown in the first two columns, and their relationship to the source and
destination ports, shown in the last two columns, are expressed by lines connecting
the various nodes. By constructing a library of these graphlets, each of which has a
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Figure 2.9: Transport Layer Interactions for Various Applications [KPF05]
unique and easily recognizable shape and connection pattern, BLINC can then com-
pare an unknown traffic flow against the library and attempt to match it to a known
application.
Through the use of a series of heuristics based on these three levels, the re-
searchers were able to classify 80-90% of network traffic with an accuracy of greater
than 95% [KPF05].
2.5 Obfuscation of Peer-to-Peer Traffic
As previously discussed in Section 2.1.3, peer-to-peer networks account for a
majority of Internet traffic. In order to combat this trend, and to preserve their band-
width, some Internet service providers (ISPs) are taking active measures to throttle
peer-to-peer traffic on their networks. For example, Comcast has developed a method
of throttling peer-to-peer traffic, whereby when the ISP’s traffic classifiers detect an
extremely active peer-to-peer connection, it transmits RESET messages to the sender
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and receiver to break the TCP connection [Sve07]. In order to combat traffic throt-
tling by ISPs, peer-to-peer clients have begun using obfuscation techniques to defeat
the traffic classifiers. Outlined below are three methods of traffic obfuscation: Byte
padding, Encryption, and Tunneling.
2.5.1 Byte Padding. One method of preventing a payload-based traffic
classifier from accurately identifying peer-to-peer traffic is to use byte padding. In
byte padding, a series of random characters is appended to the beginning of every
packet sent by the peer-to-peer client. Since payload analyzers usually look at the
first 16 to 40 bytes of payload to determine the protocol used, byte padded packets
will look like encrypted traffic and will be labeled as “unknown.”
Though this method of obfuscation is effective against primitive payload-based
classifiers, it suffers from several shortcomings. First, the messages identifying the
packet as belonging to a peer-to-peer protocol are still visible; they just appear later
in the payload. By modifying the payload-based packet analyzer to search the entire
payload of each packet, this obfuscation technique can be defeated. Second, this
obfuscation technique has no effect on network flow-based classification methods that
do not analyze the payload at all in order to identify the application being used.
2.5.2 Encryption. A more sophisticated method of obfuscation is to encrypt
the payloads of the packets being exchanged on the peer-to-peer network. Encrypting
the payloads renders payload-based classification useless, since there is no longer any
useful information available. For example, the eMule peer-to-peer client (which uses
the eDonkey peer-to-peer protocol) allows the user to enable “protocol obfuscation”,
in which users exchange keys using public key cipher, then exchange data using RC4
bit stream encryption [Pro08b].
As with byte padding, encryption has no effect on transport-layer traffic identi-
fiers, since the TCP/IP headers are still intact (only the payload is obfuscated), and
the payload is not analyzed in these methods.
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2.5.3 Tunneling. Currently, the best method of obfuscating peer-to-peer
network communication is to use a tunneling mechanism such as secure shell (SSH)
or a virtual private network (VPN). In SSH and VPN, the packets containing the
peer-to-peer protocol are themselves encrypted and encapsulated by the SSH/VPN
protocol, then sent on the network as an SSH or VPN packet. This restricts the
amount of useful data about the underlying peer-to-peer protocol to the source and
destination IP addresses, approximate packet size, and timing. Using an SSH or VPN
tunnel will defeat almost any classification method, most of which will simply identify
the peer-to-peer traffic as an encrypted tunneling protocol.
However, there has been research done on identifying the underlying traffic of
an SSH or VPN connection. In their research, Gebski, Penev, and Wong describe a
method of identifying the underlying applications within tunneling traffic [GPW06].
By constructing bipartite graphs of request and response pairs, then combining these
graphs with timing and size information, the researchers were able to identify BitTor-
rent traffic with 90% accuracy.
In their research, Wright, Monrose, and Masson achieve the same results while
using the same network information, namely packet size, timing, and direction of
flow [WMM06]. By using a combination of k-Nearest Neighbors and hidden Markov
model classifiers, the researchers were able to achieve accurate detection rates of 80-
90% for common protocols such as HTTP and telnet. In addition, they were able
to actually track the number of flows within an encrypted tunnel if they all use a
single protocol. Note that both of these methods can only confirm the existence of
peer-to-peer traffic; it cannot determine what is being downloaded.
2.6 Summary
This chapter presents background information on the evolution of peer-to-peer
networking and the major types of peer-to-peer protocols that are currently being em-
ployed. Several current methods of identifying and tracking illicit file sharers are dis-
cussed and analyzed. Current research in the areas of traditional and non-traditional
33
network traffic classification are studied. Finally, the most common techniques for
obfuscating and encrypting peer-to-peer traffic are discussed. Based on the informa-
tion provided in this chapter, payload analysis is selected as the traffic classification
method for the TRAPP system, and the issues of obfuscation and encryption are not
considered in this research due to the complexity of the problem.
34
III. The BitTorrent Peer-to-Peer Networking Protocol
This chapter presents an overview of the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol, whichwill be used extensively for this research. To provide a foundation for under-
standing the BitTorrent protocol, Section 3.1 gives an overview of how the protocol
functions to distribute files, Section 3.2 discusses specific terminology necessary for
an understanding of the protocol, Section 3.3 provides a primer on how to encode
information using BitTorrent’s bencoding system, and Section 3.4 provides a general
discussion of how the SHA-1 hash algorithm works. Once this foundation is laid,
Section 3.5 delves into the inner workings of the .torrent file, Section 3.6 describes the
BitTorrent tracker protocol which is used to request files, and Section 3.7 describes
the BitTorrent peer wire protocol which is used for the actual transfer of files.
3.1 Overview of How BitTorrent Works
One of the greatest drawbacks to Gnutella and other distributed peer-to-peer
protocols discussed in Section 2.1.2 is the fact that most users can download files
at much greater speeds than they can upload them [Rea05]. Because Gnutella-like
protocols involve one peer uploading a file to another peer that downloads it, the total
transfer speed is capped by the upload speed, which can be many times slower than
the download speed.
In 2001, Bram Cohen developed a new protocol called BitTorrent that was
designed to take advantage of high download speeds while mitigating the effect of
slow upload rates [Coh03]. The BitTorrent protocol differs from other distributed
peer-to-peer protocols in that it allows downloaders to download pieces of files from
tens or hundreds of other users simultaneously. To further speed up downloads, every
user that downloads pieces of files also uploads those pieces he already possesses. By
aggregating the slower upload speeds of hundreds of peers, the protocol can achieve
very high download rates.
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3.1.1 The Purpose of BitTorrent. BitTorrent is designed to give individuals
and businesses the power to distribute enormous amounts of data using a reduced
amount of bandwidth, which places less strain on content provider servers and reduces
the costs associated with the bandwidth. For businesses, this distributed system also
provides data redundancy in that there is now no single point of failure for loss of
data. For individuals, BitTorrent provides the fastest possible speeds due to its ability
to download data from many other peers simultaneously [Bas08].
In fact, according to BitTorrent’s author, Bram Cohen [Coh08]:
Cooperative distribution can grow almost without limit, because each new
participant brings not only demand, but also supply. Instead of a vicious
cycle, popularity creates a virtuous circle. And because each new partici-
pant brings new resources to the distribution, you get limitless scalability
for a nearly fixed cost.
3.1.2 Downloading a File Using BitTorrent. Figure 3.1 shows how the Bit-
Torrent protocol is used to download a file. As shown in the figure, when downloading
a file, the following occurs:
1. The user searches the Internet for a web site that contains the .torrent file for
the file he wishes to download.
2. The user then downloads the .torrent file and uses a BitTorrent client to open
the file.
3. The client uses the metadata contained in the .torrent to contact the tracker
and submit a peer list request using the BitTorrent tracker protocol.
4. The tracker sends the client a list of all peers currently seeding the file referenced
in the .torrent file.
5. The client sends handshake messages to the peers on the list sent to it by the
tracker, and joins the swarm. If the remote peer has the file, it will respond.
6. The client then proceeds to download pieces of the file from each seeder that
responds to the handshake message using the BitTorrent peer wire protocol. As
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Figure 3.1: How the BitTorrent Protocol Works
the client completes the download of a piece, it immediately provides the piece
to other peers in the swarm for them to download.
7. Once the entire file is downloaded, the client continues to act as a seeder for the
file until the user disconnects the client from the swarm.
3.1.3 An Example of the Power of the Swarm. In Wired magazine, Clive
Thompson provides a startling account of the power of the BitTorrent peer-to-peer
model [Tho05]. A graduate student in computer science at Stanford named Gary
Lerhaupt was intrigued by the documentary Outfoxed, and decided that he wanted to
make it available to more people. Lerhaupt contacted the film’s producer and asked
for and received permission to post a portion of the documentary on his web site as
a torrent. Over the next two months, approximately 1,500 people downloaded the
500-megabyte video, consuming around 750 gigabytes of traffic. However, because of
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the unique nature of BitTorrent, Lerhaupt himself only served up 5 gigabytes; the rest
of the data was provided by other seeders that had downloaded the file from Lerhaupt
and then served up portions themselves. In essence, BitTorrent allowed Lerhaupt to
effectively increase his data output by a factor of 150 by using the power of the swarm.
3.2 Terminology
The BitTorrent protocol uses a specific lexicon to describe different aspects
of the network’s components and functions. Outlined below are some of the more
common terms used when describing the BitTorrent protocol, and most are used later
in this section [Dir07].
3.2.1 Torrent. The term torrent has two possible meanings, depending on
context. In one case, the term torrent refers to the .torrent file that contains the
metadata necessary to download a specific file or group of files. In the other case, the
term refers to the actual file or group of files being shared.
3.2.2 Peers and Swarms. In BitTorrent, a peer is any computer running
a BitTorrent client program that is connected to the Internet and is available for
uploading or downloading information. Any collection of peers that is actively sharing
a particular torrent is called a swarm.
3.2.3 Seeders and Downloaders. As with any other peer-to-peer protocol,
BitTorrent has a number of computers uploading or downloading information to and
from each other. A seeder is a peer that possesses a complete copy of a file and is
actively making it available to other peers for download. A downloader, on the other
hand, is a peer that does not have a complete copy of the torrent and is actively re-
trieving it from other peers. As stated previously, any peer that downloads a torrent
is also serving up those pieces already downloaded to other peers. So, in the BitTor-
rent protocol, all downloaders are also uploaders (at least until the file is completely
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download, at which time the downloader can choose whether or not to be a seeder for
the torrent).
3.2.4 Leeches and Lurkers. The success of the BitTorrent protocol depends
on peers offering files for seeding once they are downloaded. A leech is a peer that
does not make files available for seeding once they are downloaded, does not add any
new content for download, and may artificially reduce its upload speed to limit the
amount of data uploaded. A lurker is similar to a leecher in that the peer does not
offer any new content for download. However, a lurker, unlike a leecher, becomes a
seeder for any files downloaded.
3.2.5 Trackers. A tracker is a server whose purpose is to keep track of
what seeders and peers are available in a particular swarm. The tracker usually also
contains a web server containing .torrent files that are available for download. The
tracker only provides coordination; it is in no way involved in actual file transfer and
does not contain copies of files to share.
3.2.6 Blocks versus Pieces. When a file is made available for downloading,
it is divided into pieces, which are equal sized portions of the file (except for the
last piece), and are almost always a power of 2 in length, measured in bytes. In the
latest version of the BitTorrent protocol, the piece length defaults to 218 bytes =
256 kilobytes [Coh08]. Each piece is hashed using SHA-1 and the resulting 160-bit
hash is placed in the .torrent file. A block is a portion of a piece that is requested
by the downloader; when all blocks in a piece are retrieved, they are combined into a
piece, error checked, then made available for download to other peers.
3.3 Bencoding
Bencoding (pronounced “Bee Encoding”) is the method that BitTorrent uses
to encode and organize data within .torrent files [Coh08] [Bit08]. It provides support
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for encoding integers, byte strings, lists, and dictionaries. Outlined below are the
encoding formats and how they are created.
3.3.1 Encoding Integers. To encode an integer, use the following format:
i<integer encoded in base 10 ASCII>e
Examples: i786e i-8754e
The i and e are the beginning and ending delimiters for the number. For
negative numbers, insert a “-” sign before the number. The use of leading zeros (e.g.,
i00045e) is prohibited.
3.3.2 Encoding Strings. To encode a byte string, use the following format:
<string length in base 10 ASCII>:<byte string>
Examples: 6:pieces 4:name
In this case, there are no beginning or ending delimiters. The contents of the
byte string can contain either a string of ASCII characters or, in the case of SHA-1
hashes, pure binary data. Thus, the use of a hex editor is essential to read the contents
of a bencoded byte string.
3.3.3 Encoding Lists. To encode a list composed of any other type of
bencoded data, use the following format:
l<bencoded data>e
Example: l6:piecesi256ee
Note that in the example, the list ends with two e’s. The first e delimits the
integer value and the second e delimits the list.
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3.3.4 Encoding Dictionaries. To encode a dictionary consisting of elements
and keys, use the following format:
d<bencoded key><bencoded element><bencoded key><bencoded element>e
Example: d6:piecesi64e6:lengthi16256ee represents pieces => 64
and length => 16256.
In the case of dictionaries, the keys must be bencoded strings, and the values
may be any bencoded type, including integers, strings, lists, or other dictionaries.
3.4 The SHA-1 Hash
RFC 3174 was created to implement the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1),
designed by the United States Government and labeled the Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standards Publication 180-1 (FIPS 180-1) [RFC01]. The SHA-1 algorithm
takes a binary message of less than 264 bits and produces a 160-bit output message
labeled a message digest. This message digest can then be used to generate a digital
signature, providing authenticity for the original message [FIP93].
3.4.1 Creating a Message Digest. As stated in FIPS 180-1, the message
digest is created by applying the following series of steps to the original message:
1. Pad the message. The message is padded with a 1, a series of 0s, then a 64-bit
integer that represents the total length of the message, so that the total message
length is a multiple of 512.
2. Divide the message. The message is divided into 512-bit blocks, where each
block is composed of 16 words of 32 bits each.
3. Initialize the constants. Before the algorithm is applied, 5 constants, each 32 bits
long and labeled A through E, are initialized with values determined by the
standard [RFC01]. These constants are combined with the message words using
modular arithmetic to produce the message digest.
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Figure 3.2: How a Round in the SHA-1 Hashing Algorithm Works [MRR08]
4. Apply the algorithm. As shown in Figure 3.2, the 32-bit message words A, B,
C, D, and E are taken 5 at a time and run through a series of mathematical
operations. In the figure, f is a varying nonlinear function, << denotes a left
shift by the indicated number of bits, W is the expanded message word for the
round, K is the constant for the round, and + indicates addition modulo 232. At
the end of 80 of these rounds, the 5 words remaining (shown at the bottom of
the figure) are concatenated to create the (5 words * 32 bits per word = 160 bits)
160-bit message digest.
3.4.2 Security of the SHA-1 Standard. According to the FIPS 180-1 stan-
dard, the SHA-1 hash is considered to be a secure hash because “it is computationally
infeasible to find a message which corresponds to a given message digest, or to find
two different messages which produce the same message digest. Any change to a mes-
sage in transit will, with very high probability, result in a different message digest,
and the signature will fail to verify” [FIP93].
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Researchers around the world are currently attempting to construct collisions
(two messages that produce the same message digest) using SHA-1. In 2005, a team
of researchers in China discovered a method that theoretically can produce a collision
using 269 operations. While this number of computations is still unfeasible, it is less
than the commonly accepted bound of 280 operations, which is considered to be the
minimum number of computations for a system to be secure [MRR08].
3.4.3 Use of the SHA-1 Hash in BitTorrent. The SHA-1 algorithm is used
in the BitTorrent protocol for two purposes, error correction and file identification.
In error correction, the SHA-1 algorithm is applied to each block of the file to
be uploaded via BitTorrent. These message digests are then placed in the .torrent file
that the client downloads. Once a block is completely downloaded from the seeders,
the client applies the SHA-1 to the downloaded block and compares the message
digest to the one in the .torrent file. If the two hashes match, the client assumes that
the transfer was error-free.
In file identification, the SHA-1 algorithm is applied to the information dictio-
nary contained in the .torrent file. The resulting message digest is labeled as the
file identifier, which will uniquely identify the file being offered for download regard-
less of the file description provided by the tracker. When a downloader requests a
file, the client will provide the hash as the file identifier in the GET request. This
method prevents two files that have the same description but different contents from
being confused with each other when downloading blocks from peers. More informa-
tion on how to compute the information dictionary hash from the .torrent file is in
Section 3.5.3.
3.5 The .torrent File
The .torrent file contains metadata that allows a BitTorrent client to connect
to a tracker, obtain a peer list, and download the file requested. The contents of the
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.torrent file are outlined below, followed by an example of a .torrent file downloaded
from the Internet.
3.5.1 Contents of the .torrent File. All information in the .torrent file is
bencoded and contains the following fields [Bit08]:
• announce. This is the URL of the tracker from which the peer list will be
downloaded.
• creation date. This is the creation time of the .torrent file, in standard UNIX
epoch format.
• info. A bencoded dictionary containing the rest of the items below.
• length. This is the length of the file to be downloaded in bytes.
• name. The name of the file to be downloaded.
• piece length. The length of each piece of the file in bytes.
• pieces. A byte stream containing the SHA-1 hashes of each piece concatenated
together. The length of this byte stream will always be a multiple of 20.
• path. Used to identify the file structure of a .torrent that contains multiple files.
3.5.2 Example of a .torrent File. The following .torrent represents a 2,133,210-
byte file, named freeculture.zip which is available from the www.legaltorrents.com
website [Les08a]. Note that for this example, the portion of the file containing the <>
delimiters (which are not actually contained in the file) and the contents within are
the 180 bytes of binary data converted to hexadecimal and represented in ASCII for
readability purposes.
d8:announce42:http://www.legaltorrents.com:7070/announce13:creation
datei1081312084e4:infod6:lengthi2133210e4:name15:freeculture.zip12:
piece lengthi262144e6:pieces180:<ED89E7384B0D340FA5FFFA19D1A00D88E7
54BE00505C6EDB15D307AA8E463891F4D2530E8DD1390A0476F3973BA169B561031
44
ECC4328751A4C0094E1F23149441F4A2C95E2A7C8C1804BBDF379F39DDC4E4356CB
152A7A4B6BC5CC1C9079ABD1E4F7C4225E685CFC63562F81AED6911A0F92C83026D
4D8673CA2233427C06B20C2CED026B7B84932B3C12655DBEF49E0057373AC89D056
2758F391A5F7DEAB52B2DD59AF12E3441B8B5393FF8D76DE6BC1910F84>ee
Before analyzing this particular .torrent file, it is helpful to add line breaks and
spaces to make the contents more readable:
d8:announce 42:http://www.legaltorrents.com:7070/announce
13:creation date i1081312084e
4:info
d6:length i2133210e
4:name 15:freeculture.zip
12:piece length i262144e
6:pieces 180:
<ED 89 E7 38 4B 0D 34 0F A5 FF FA 19 D1 A0 0D 88 E7 54 BE 00
50 5C 6E DB 15 D3 07 AA 8E 46 38 91 F4 D2 53 0E 8D D1 39 0A
04 76 F3 97 3B A1 69 B5 61 03 1E CC 43 28 75 1A 4C 00 94 E1
F2 31 49 44 1F 4A 2C 95 E2 A7 C8 C1 80 4B BD F3 79 F3 9D DC
4E 43 56 CB 15 2A 7A 4B 6B C5 CC 1C 90 79 AB D1 E4 F7 C4 22
5E 68 5C FC 63 56 2F 81 AE D6 91 1A 0F 92 C8 30 26 D4 D8 67
3C A2 23 34 27 C0 6B 20 C2 CE D0 26 B7 B8 49 32 B3 C1 26 55
DB EF 49 E0 05 73 73 AC 89 D0 56 27 58 F3 91 A5 F7 DE AB 52
B2 DD 59 AF 12 E3 44 1B 8B 53 93 FF 8D 76 DE 6B C1 91 0F 84>ee
Deconstructing this example, the following information can be extracted:
• Location of the tracker: http://www.legaltorrents.com:7070/announce
• Creation date: Wednesday, 7 April 2004 at 04:28:04 UTC
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• File length: 2,133,210 bytes
• File name: freeculture.zip
• Piece length: 262,144 bytes or 256 Kilobytes per piece
• Number of pieces: 180 bytes of binary data divided by 20 bytes (160 bits) per
piece = 9 pieces total.
3.5.3 Computing the Information Dictionary Hash Value. For later portions
of the research, the information dictionary hash value, also known as the file info hash,
takes on enormous importance. Recall that when a peer wants to download a file,
the BitTorrent client will take the information dictionary portion of the .torrent file,
apply the SHA-1 algorithm, and use that 160-bit value as the file identifier. This
unique 20-byte identifier is then used in the BitTorrent GET request message to ask
the swarm for the file.
However, it is not immediately clear exactly which portion of the .torrent file
is processed using the SHA-1 algorithm to generate the hash. After an exhaustive
brute force search, the portion of the file used for hashing was discovered to be the
byte stream beginning with the string d6:length and ending with the first e after
the hash values of the file pieces.
In the example above, the information dictionary hash value is based on the
following byte stream:
d6:length i2133210e
4:name 15:freeculture.zip
12:piece length i262144e
6:pieces 180:
<ED 89 E7 38 4B 0D 34 0F A5 FF FA 19 D1 A0 0D 88 E7 54 BE 00
50 5C 6E DB 15 D3 07 AA 8E 46 38 91 F4 D2 53 0E 8D D1 39 0A
04 76 F3 97 3B A1 69 B5 61 03 1E CC 43 28 75 1A 4C 00 94 E1
F2 31 49 44 1F 4A 2C 95 E2 A7 C8 C1 80 4B BD F3 79 F3 9D DC
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4E 43 56 CB 15 2A 7A 4B 6B C5 CC 1C 90 79 AB D1 E4 F7 C4 22
5E 68 5C FC 63 56 2F 81 AE D6 91 1A 0F 92 C8 30 26 D4 D8 67
3C A2 23 34 27 C0 6B 20 C2 CE D0 26 B7 B8 49 32 B3 C1 26 55
DB EF 49 E0 05 73 73 AC 89 D0 56 27 58 F3 91 A5 F7 DE AB 52
B2 DD 59 AF 12 E3 44 1B 8B 53 93 FF 8D 76 DE 6B C1 91 0F 84>e
Running this portion of the .torrent byte stream through a SHA-1 hash value
generator, the following message digest is created:
<CA 6A C4 BB D9 71 D3 90 29 35 DB CF C2 D3 EA 25 B4 28 A5 47>
3.6 The Tracker Protocol
The first protocol used by BitTorrent is the tracker protocol, which runs on top
of HTTP. The protocol consists of two messages: The peer list request made by the
client to the tracker that also includes file transfer statistics used by the tracker, and
the response message from the tracker that provides the client with a list of peers
that are seeding the file of interest to the client.
3.6.1 The File GET Request. To request a peer list from the tracker, the
client sends a GET request containing the following fields:
1. GET /announce. Header for the GET request.
2. info_hash. The 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the information dictionary used to
uniquely identify the file to be downloaded. Note that since the GET request is
transmitted in ASCII, this value will have to be escaped using the %xx format
as described in RFC 1738 [RFC94].
3. peer_id. A 20-byte string that uniquely identifies the BitTorrent client request-
ing the file. This ID is created by the client sending the request.
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4. port. The port number that the client is listening on.
5. uploaded. The total amount of data in bytes uploaded since the first started
message was sent to this tracker.
6. downloaded. The total amount of data in bytes downloaded since the first
started message was sent to this tracker.
7. left. The total amount of data in bytes left to be downloaded.
8. key. An optional field containing an ASCII string used by a client to reconnect
to the tracker should its IP address change.
9. event. This may be one of three values:
(a) started. Sent when the client first connects to the tracker.
(b) stopped. Sent when the client disconnects from the tracker before the
download is complete.
(c) completed. Sent when the client completes the file download.
10. numwant. An optional field that indicates how many peers the client wants the
tracker to provide.
11. compact. Indicates whether the client can accept a compressed version of the
peer list, which is composed of six bytes per peer (4 bytes for the IP address
and 2 bytes for the port number).
12. no_peer_id. Indicates whether the client is requesting peer id numbers for each
peer in the list.
13. Host. The URL and port number of the tracker the request is being sent to.
14. User-Agent. The name and version number of the client being used.
15. Accept-Encoding. The type of encoding accepted by the client.
3.6.2 The Tracker Response. Upon receiving the GET request, the tracker,
if it has the information requested, will send a response containing the following fields:
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1. HTTP/1.0 200 OK.
2. Content-Length, Content-Type, and Pragma. Additional information associ-
ated with the HTTP OK message.
3. 8:complete. The number of peers that have the entire file, a.k.a. seeders.
4. 10:incomplete. The number of peers that are in the swarm, but do not have
the entire file, a.k.a. downloaders.
5. 8:interval. The interval in seconds that the client should wait between sending
requests to the tracker.
6. 5:peers. A byte string containing the IP addresses and port numbers of all
peers in the swarm. If the peers are sent in the compacted format (see the GET
request above), this byte string will have a length that is a multiple of six.
3.6.3 Tracker Request and Response Example. The following tracker re-
quest and tracker response are taken from the download of a 103,372,284-byte file,
named freeculture-audiobook.zip which is available from the www.legaltorrents.com
website [Les08b]. Note that for this example, the portion of the file containing the
<> delimiters (which are not actually contained in the file) and the contents within
are binary data converted to hexadecimal and represented in ASCII for readability
purposes.
First, the client sends a GET request to the tracker at address 8.12.35.122:7070,
which corresponds to the URL http://www.legaltorrents.com:7070/announce, and is
the same URL as the previous example:
GET /announce?info_hash=%10%1c%9dc%21%1c%3cW%0f%fb%ad%d4%9cVI%d3%fb
Irs&peer_id=-UT1770-%f3%9f%fd%c7t%b5jLSR%c1%1c&port=43438&uploaded=
0&downloaded=0&left=103372284&key=7F29A0C7&event=started&numwant=20
0&compact=1&no_peer_id=1 HTTP/1.1<0D0A>Host: www.legaltorrents.com:
7070<0D0A>User-Agent: uTorrent/1770<0D0A>Accept-Encoding: gzip<0D0A
0D0A>
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Again, it is helpful to reorganize the message for readability purposes:
GET /announce
?info_hash=%10%1c%9dc%21%1c%3cW%0f%fb%ad%d4%9cVI%d3%fbIrs
&peer_id=-UT1770-%f3%9f%fd%c7t%b5jLSR%c1%1c
&port=43438
&uploaded=0
&downloaded=0
&left=103372284
&key=7F29A0C7
&event=started
&numwant=200
&compact=1
&no_peer_id=1
HTTP/1.1 (Carriage Return/Line Feed)
Host: www.legaltorrents.com:7070 (CR/LF)
User-Agent: uTorrent/1770 (CR/LF)
Accept-Encoding: gzip (CR/LF/CR/LF)
Note that the info_hash and peer_id fields are composed of hexadecimal num-
bers that have been escaped into ASCII.
After the tracker receives the GET request, it sends the following back to the
client:
HTTP/1.0 200 OK<0D0A>Content-Length: 69<0D0A>Content-Type: text/pla
in<0D0A>Pragma:no-cache<0D0A0D0A>d8:completei8e10:incompletei1e8:in
tervali1800e5:peers12:<4B8B8403F5DBD0452AC21B9F>e
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And, after reordering for readability purposes:
HTTP/1.0 200 OK (Carriage Return/Line Feed)
Content-Length: 69 (CR/LF)
Content-Type: text/plain (CR/LF)
Pragma:no-cache (CR/LF/CR/LF)
d8:complete i8e
10:incomplete i1e
8:interval i1800e
5:peers 12:<4B 8B 84 03 F5 DB D0 45 2A C2 1B 9F>e
Note that the tracker sends back the addresses of two peers that are actively
seeding the file. These addresses and port numbers, in dotted quad notation are:
4B 8B 84 03 F5 DB
75 . 139 . 132 . 3 : 62939
and
D0 45 2A C2 1B 9F
208 . 69 . 42 . 194 : 7071
Now that the client has the addresses of two peers, it can use the peer wire
protocol to begin downloading the file.
3.7 The Peer Wire Protocol
The peer wire protocol is the other main protocol used by BitTorrent, and runs
on top of TCP. The purpose of this protocol is to enable the exchange of file pieces
enumerated in the .torrent files. The peer wire protocol serves two main functions,
handshaking and exchanging messages pertaining to the actual transfer of file pieces
between peers.
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3.7.1 The Handshake. Continuing the previous example, the client sends
the following handshake request to each of the two peers in the list provided by the
tracker.
<13>BitTorrent protocol<0000000000100001101C9D63211C3C570FFBADD49C5
649D3FB4972732D5554313737302DF39FFDC774B56A4C5352C11C>
As with the .torrent file, before analyzing this particular request, it is helpful to
add line breaks and spaces to make the contents more readable:
<13> BitTorrent protocol
<00 00 00 00 00 10 00 01
10 1C 9D 63 21 1C 3C 57 0F FB AD D4 9C 56 49 D3 FB 49 72 73
2D 55 54 31 37 37 30 2D F3 9F FD C7 74 B5 6A 4C 53 52 C1 1C>
Deconstructing this example, the following information can be extracted:
1. String length of the name of the protocol used: Decimal number “19” in hex
(0x13).
2. Protocol header: The ASCII string “BitTorrent protocol”. Note that the string
has 19 characters in it, hence the “19” as the string length above.
3. Reserved extension bytes: 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 01
4. SHA-1 hash of information dictionary:
10 1C 9D 63 21 1C 3C 57 0F FB AD D4 9C 56 49 D3 FB 49 72 73
5. Peer ID:
2D 55 54 31 37 37 30 2D F3 9F FD C7 74 B5 6A 4C 53 52 C1 1C.
Note that the string 2D 55 54 31 37 37 30 2D corresponds to the ACSII string
-UT1770-. This denotes that a uTorrent client running version 1.7.7 created the
.torrent file [Bit08].
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3.7.2 Other Messages. Once the handshake is complete, the client and
remote peer use the peer wire protocol to exchange messages to coordinate the ex-
change of file piece data. The standard messages supported by the BitTorrent peer
wire protocol are listed below [Bit08]:
• choke. Sent by a remote peer to a downloader informing it that no requests for
data will be honored until the downloader is unchoked.
• unchoke. Sent by a remote peer to a downloader informing it that it will honor
the downloader’s requests for data.
• interested. Sent by a client to a remote peer informing it that the remote
peer has data the client wishes to download.
• not interested. Sent by a client to a remote peer informing it that the remote
peer does not have data the client wishes to download.
• have. Sent by a downloader when a piece has completed downloading and the
hash has been correctly matched to the .torrent file.
• bitfield. Sent by a downloader as the first message. This message contains a
string of bits representing each piece of the file, with a 1 set for each piece that
the downloader possesses, otherwise 0.
• request. Sent by a downloader to request a portion of a file piece. This message
contains the index of the piece within the file, the offset from the beginning of
the piece, and the amount of data requested.
• piece. Sent by the peer to the downloader in response to the request message.
This message contains the index of the piece, the byte offset, and the actual
data requested.
• cancel. Sent by the downloader to cancel the download of a block of data.
• keep-alive. Sent by a peer to keep a connection from being torn down if there
is no data being sent in either direction.
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3.8 Summary
This chapter provides an overview and discussion of the BitTorrent peer-to-
peer protocol. The purpose of the protocol is given, and the services provided by
the protocol are discussed. A typical BitTorrent file transfer session is described, and
selected terminology and data encoding techniques are discussed. The contents of the
.torrent file are analyzed, and the operations of the tracker protocol and peer wire
protocol are explained. In particular, the peer wire protocol’s handshake packet is
identified and analyzed by the forensic tool in order to extract the unique 20-byte
hash of the file to be transferred. Finally, real-world examples of BitTorrent messages
are examined, and their contents analyzed.
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IV. The Session Initiation Protocol
This chapter presents an overview of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), whichis the other peer-to-peer protocol that is used extensively in this research. To
provide a foundation for understanding SIP, Section 4.1 gives an overview of how the
protocol functions to make multimedia session connections. Section 4.2 discusses spe-
cific terminology necessary for an understanding of the protocol. Finally, Section 4.3
describes how SIP request and response messages are created, and examples of the
two request messages used in the research are analyzed.
4.1 Overview of How SIP Works
4.1.1 The Purpose of SIP. In 1999, Henning Schulzrinne of Columbia Uni-
versity submitted the plan for a protocol to establish and control multiparty multi-
media sessions, and was approved by the IETF as RFC 2543, the Session Initiation
Protocol [Ubi08]. According to the updated version of the protocol, IETF RFC 3261,
“SIP is an application-layer control protocol that can establish, modify, and terminate
multimedia sessions (conferences) such as Internet telephony calls” [RFC02]. The goal
of SIP is not to exchange data between participants; rather, its purpose is to allow
the participants to find one another, and to manage the data connection one estab-
lished. This allows SIP to used for a large number of data transfer applications, such
as interactive gaming, media on demand, and voice or video conferencing [Ubi08].
The Session Initiation Protocol provides for the following basic requirements for
setting up, managing, and tearing down communication sessions [RFC02]:
• User Location: Finding the address of the end system to be used for the com-
munication.
• User Availability: Determining if the party being called is willing to join the
communication.
• User Capabilities: Determining what type of communications both parties use
for communication.
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• Session Setup: Establishment of the communication session parameters for both
parties.
• Session Management: Governing the transfer of data, terminating communica-
tion sessions, and modifying session parameters.
Because SIP is an open source protocol, it is rapidly becoming the de facto
standard for multimedia session control. SIP is currently used by the popular VoIP
provider Vonage [Cis02], by Microsoft for its MSN Messenger system [Ubi08], and by
Yahoo! for its Yahoo! Messenger system [Cor05]. SIP has also been selected by the 3G
Community to be its session control protocol for the 3G cellular network [Ubi08], and
Google is planning to incorporate SIP into the protocol used by its popular Google
Talk service [Goo08].
4.1.2 Making a VoIP Call Using SIP. Figure 4.1 shows how the Session
Initiation Protocol is used to make a phone call from one VoIP client to another VoIP
client. As shown in the figure, when making a SIP call, the following occurs [RFC02]:
1. The call originator’s SIP client sends an INVITE request to the proxy server.
2. The proxy server queries the registrar server for the address of the recipient’s
SIP client. At the same time, the proxy server sends a message to the call
originator indicating that it is attempting to connect the call.
3. The registrar server responds to the proxy server with an IP address where the
recipient can be reached.
4. The proxy server forwards the INVITE message to the call recipient.
5. The recipient’s SIP client responds that the phone is ringing and is awaiting the
recipient to accept the call. The message also contains the IP address and port
number of the call recipient for a direct connection at a later time.
6. When the recipient accepts the call, a message is sent from the recipient’s SIP
client to the proxy server indicating that the call has been answered.
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Figure 4.1: How the Session Initiation Protocol Works
7. The proxy server forwards the call answer message to the originator’s SIP client.
8. The call originator’s SIP client then sends a call acknowledgment directly to the
call recipient’s SIP client, completing the three-way handshake and beginning
the communication session.
9. After the call is completed, one of the parties hangs up, generating a BYE
message to the other caller and to the proxy server.
10. The other caller sends an confirmation of the BYE message, ending the SIP
connection.
4.2 Terminology
The Session Initiation Protocol uses a specific lexicon to describe different as-
pects of the protocol’s components and functions. Outlined below are some of the
most common terms when describing how SIP works, and are used throughout this
chapter [RFC02].
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4.2.1 Call. A call is an informal term that describes some kind of communi-
cation between peers that is set up using the SIP protocol. The communication may
consist of any type of voice-only or multimedia conversation.
4.2.2 Message. A message is a set of data sent between elements of the SIP
protocol. Messages are usually in the form of either requests or responses.
4.2.3 Proxy Server. A proxy server is a machine that performs the functions
of both a server and a client for the purpose of routing requests between clients and
servers. When it receives a request from a client, the proxy server queries the registrar
server to retrieve the message recipient’s addressing information, then forwards the
request to the recipient on behalf of the sender.
4.2.4 Registrar Server. A registrar server contains a database of the loca-
tions of all SIP clients within a network domain. When a call is initiated by a client,
the client’s proxy server will query the registrar server and retrieve the recipient’s IP
address, if it resides in the same domain as the sender.
4.2.5 Requests and Responses. A request is a SIP message that is sent from
a client to a server in order to cause the server to perform some action. A response
is a SIP message sent from a server to a client that contains the status of the request.
4.2.6 SIP Uniform Resource Identifier. A SIP Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI) is the address where a SIP client can be found on a network. It uses the same
user@host format as an email address, and usually contains a user name and a host
name. In SIP messages, the SIP URI is prefaced by the sip: identifier. For example,
sip:alice@afit.edu and sip:2001@10.1.1.1 are both valid SIP URIs. For the
purposes of this research, the terms SIP URI and phone number are interchangeable.
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4.3 SIP Messages
4.3.1 Request Messages. SIP request messages are plain text messages used
to communicate information from a client to a server in order to invoke some action by
the server. The SIP specification defines six types of request messages, called request
methods [RFC02]:
• REGISTER: Registers a client’s contact information with a registrar server.
• INVITE: Used to initiate a SIP connection from one client to another.
• ACK: Sent by the call initiator to confirm the reception of a response message.
• CANCEL: Cancels a pending SIP request.
• BYE: Used to terminate a SIP connection session.
• OPTIONS: Used for querying servers about their capabilities.
All SIP request message headers use the same general format. The first line of
the header must contain the Request-Line field, which contains the request method,
the recipient’s address, and the protocol version. All other header fields may be placed
in any order. Listed below are some of the most common fields found in SIP request
messages [RFC02]:
1. Request-Line. A string containing a request method, the SIP URI of the
message’s recipient, and the SIP version number.
2. Via. A string containing the SIP version number and transport protocol used
(TCP or UDP), the address where the sender expects responses to be sent, and a
branch parameter which is a unique alphanumeric string that uniquely identifies
the request transaction.
3. Max-Forwards. This is the maximum number of hops a request can transit en
route to the destination address. The integer is decremented by one every time
it transits a router. If the counter reaches 0 before reaching its destination, the
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request will be rejected. For most clients and servers, this value is initially set
to 70 [RFC02].
4. Contact. This field contains the SIP URI that represents a direct route to the
sender’s SIP client.
5. To. This field specifies the SIP URI of the request message’s intended recipient.
The field may also contain the display name associated with the recipient’s SIP
URI.
6. From. This field specifies the SIP URI of the request message’s originator. Like
the To field, this may contain both the display name and the SIP URI of the
sender.
7. CSeq. A string that consists of an integer that serves to order transactions and
the request method from the Request-Line. The start number may be any
arbitrary 32-bit unsigned integer less than 231, and is incremented by one for
each additional transaction message sent during the call.
8. Call-Id. An alphanumeric string that acts as a unique identifier for the series
of messages associated with a single call. This string must be the same for
all messages sent during the call. The RFC also recommends that the strings
be cryptographically random identifiers to avoid possible session hijacking and
unintentional Call-Id collisions [RFC02].
9. Allow. A string containing the methods supported by the SIP client that is
sending the message.
10. Content-Type. A string containing the description of the message body.
11. User-Agent. This field contains information about the client that sent the
message.
12. Content-Length. An integer representing the number of bytes contained in the
message body.
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In this research, the INVITE and BYE requests are captured and examined by
the experimental apparatus to determine the originator and recipient of the SIP call.
Examples of these two request messages are described in detail below.
4.3.1.1 INVITE Request Example. The following INVITE message
is taken from an actual SIP call made from one X-Lite VoIP soft phone [Cor08]
to another X-Lite soft phone via an Trixbox registrar/proxy server [Tri08]. This
particular message is from the originator at SIP URI 2002@10.1.1.50 and is sent to
the SIP URI 2001@10.1.1.50. The packet’s header is shown below:
INVITE sip:2001@10.1.1.50 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.1.1.2:7887;branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-
bc490705ed79367c-1--d87543-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: <sip:2002@10.1.1.2:7887>
To: "2001"<sip:2001@10.1.1.50>
From: "Tester Two"<sip:2002@10.1.1.50>;tag=e07be27e
Call-ID: MTA3ZTZlM2U4ZjRlZDY5ODJmOTMyYTFmMWZiZmFmZTM.
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, NOTIFY,
MESSAGE, SUBSCRIBE, INFO
Content-Type: application/sdp
User-Agent: X-Lite release 1011s stamp 41150
Content-Length: 406
Deconstructing this example, the following information can be extracted:
• Destination SIP URI of the message: 2001@10.1.1.50
• SIP version number: 2.0
• IP address and port number to which the sender expects responses to this re-
quest: 10.1.1.2:7887
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• Number of forwards left in this message: 70
• IP address and port number of a direct route to contact the sender of the
message: 10.1.1.2:7887
• Display name and SIP URI of the eventual recipient of the message: “Tester
One”, 2001@10.1.1.50
• Display name and SIP URI of the originator of the message: “Tester Two”,
2002@10.1.1.50
• Type of SIP client used to send the message: X-Lite release 1011s
• Length of the message body: 406 bytes
In this example, the call originator sends the INVITE message to the Trixbox
proxy/registrar server at IP address 10.1.1.50, where the server looks up the recipient’s
address, modifies the INVITE message with the updated information, and forwards
the message to the next hop closer to the recipient. Note that the SIP URI in the From
field contains the IP address of the Trixbox registrar server (10.1.1.50). This allows
other SIP clients on the Internet to contact the static address of the registrar server
where the sender’s client is registered. The Contact field, however provides the actual
IP address and port number (10.1.1.2:7887) of the SIP client sending the message,
which the server will then use to deliver the call recipient’s reply to the INVITE
message. The To field contains the SIP URI of the INVITE message’s intended
recipient, which in this case is on the same domain as the sender.
4.3.1.2 BYE Request Example. The following BYE message is taken
from the same SIP call that generated the INVITE message above (note the iden-
tical Call-ID fields). This particular message is from the originator at SIP URI
2001@10.1.1.50 and is sent to the SIP URI 2002@10.1.1.50. The packet’s header is
shown below:
BYE sip:2002@10.1.1.2:7887 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.1.1.50:5060;
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branch=z9hG4bK46506adf;rport
From: "2001"<sip:2001@10.1.1.50>;tag=as1b5be240
To: "Tester Two"<sip:2002@10.1.1.50>;tag=e07be27e
Call-ID: MTA3ZTZlM2U4ZjRlZDY5ODJmOTMyYTFmMWZiZmFmZTM.
CSeq: 102 BYE
User-Agent: Asterisk PBX
Max-Forwards: 70
Content-Length: 0
In this example, the Via field shows that this message is actually from the
Trixbox server at IP address 10.1.1.50:5060, and is being forwarded to SIP URI
2002@10.1.1.50 on behalf of SIP URI 2001@10.1.1.50. The fact that the User-Agent
is an Asterisk PBX confirms this fact.
4.3.2 Response Messages. Response messages differ from request messages
in that they have a status line as the first line of the message. The status line
consists of the SIP version followed by a Status-Code and its Reason-Phrase. Table 4.1
describes the main types of Status-Codes. Note that the Status-Codes used by SIP are
almost identical to those used by HTTP, with the exception of the 6xx codes [RFC99].
Table 4.1: Status Codes for SIP Response Messages [RFC02]
Status-Code Response Type Meaning
1xx Provisional Request received, continuing to process the request
2xx Success The action was successfully received and accepted
3xx Redirection Further action needs to be taken to complete the request
4xx Client Error Request contains bad syntax or can’t be fulfilled by the server
5xx Server Error Server failed to fulfill an apparently valid request
6xx Global Failure Request cannot be fulfilled at any server
Other than the first line of the message header, response message headers contain
the same fields as request messages. When a client or server generates a response
to a request, the response code is placed in the first line of the header, and the
Via, To, From, Call-ID, and CSeq fields are copied from the request header to the
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response header. The Contact field is then added which contains the SIP URI that
represents a direct route to the client or server that generated the response.
4.4 Summary
This chapter provides an overview and discussion of the Session Initiation Pro-
tocol. The purpose of the protocol is given, and the services provided by the protocol
are discussed. A typical SIP session is described, and selected terminology is defined.
SIP request and response messages are analyzed, and real world examples of the IN-
VITE and BYE messages are deconstructed. In particular, the SIP INVITE and BYE
packets are identified and analyzed by the forensic tool in order to extract the caller
and receiver SIP URIs, and are also used to determine the beginning and end of the
SIP session.
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V. Methodology
This chapter presents the methodology used to evaluate the performance of theTRAPP system using two different metrics: the time required to process a
packet, and the probability of packet intercept under high network utilization. First,
the problem definition, goals and hypotheses, and approach are discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1. Section 5.2 defines the system boundaries. The system and its services are
described in Section 5.3, followed by a detailed description of workload in Section 5.4,
performance metrics in Section 5.5, parameters in Section 5.6, and factors in Sec-
tion 5.7. Then, the evaluation technique is discussed in Section 5.8 followed by a
description of the experimental design in Section 5.9. Finally, the techniques used to
analyze and interpret the data are covered in Section 5.10.
5.1 Problem Definition
5.1.1 Goals and Hypotheses. The objective of this thesis is to develop
a system to identify and track specific digital information being transmitted on a
network using peer-to-peer protocols. The proposed system will detect peer-to-peer
transmissions on a target network, classify them by specific peer-to-peer protocol,
compare the digital file being transmitted against a list of interest, and identify the
sender and recipient by Internet Protocol (IP) address.
The goals of this research are to:
• Construct an FPGA-based system that analyzes traffic on a network, detects
a selected peer-to-peer protocol, compares the digital information being shared
against a list of interest, and in the case of a match, records selected control
packets (“packets of interest”) from the peer-to-peer session in a log file.
• Optimize the system such that it is able to detect and record all packets of inter-
est on the network, even under a heavy (approximately 90 percent utilization)
non-peer-to-peer traffic load.
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• Modify the system to detect and record control packets of interest belonging to
a second peer-to-peer protocol with no negative impact on overall performance.
It is hypothesized that a system equipped for a single peer-to-peer protocol can
be constructed and optimized such that a packet of interest is detected and recorded on
a network with 90% utilization with at least 95% probability. It is also hypothesized
that the system can be expanded to include a second peer-to-peer protocol while
maintaining at least a 95% probability of intercept for a packet of interest from either
peer-to-peer protocol.
5.1.2 Approach. A hardware-based forensic tool is designed using the Virtex
II Pro FPGA development board [Xil08b] and the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol.
Implementing the system on an FPGA allows the software application to directly
access the Ethernet controller buffers, bypassing the rest of the network stack and
increasing the system’s simplicity and speed. Once the system is optimized and
tested using this protocol, the system is expanded to also process the Session Initiation
Protocol, and tested again. Details on the hardware construction of the system are
in Appendix A.
Figure 5.1 shows the overall functionality of the design. When the system
processes a packet, the following occurs:
1. The tool fingerprints the frame received from the network by extracting the first
32 bits of the frame’s payload.
2. The 32-bit fingerprint is then compared to the first 32 bits of a BitTorrent Hand-
shake message, which is 0x13426974 [Bit08], a SIP INVITE message, which is
the ASCII string “INVI”, or a SIP BYE message, which is the ASCII string
“BYE ” [RFC02].
3. If the first word of the frame’s payload is not a match to any of these strings,
the frame is discarded.
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Figure 5.1: Packet Data Flow through the TRAPP System
4. If the word matches that of a BitTorrent Handshake message, the first 32 bits
of the Handshake’s file info hash is extracted from the frame, and compared
against a list of hashes belonging to files of interest using a binary search.
5. If the word matches that of a SIP message, the first 12 characters of the TO and
FROM SIP URIs are extracted from the frame, and each is compared against a
separate list of SIP URIs of interest using a binary search.
6. If the file info hash/SIP URI is not on the list, the frame is dropped.
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Figure 5.2: Experiments and Tests Used to Achieve the Research Goals
7. If the file info hash/SIP URI is on the list, the frame is saved in a Wireshark-
readable log file and placed on a Compact Flash card. The frames recorded in
the log file are later analyzed to extract IP address information, which can then
be used to perform tracking and forensic analysis.
As shown in Figure 5.2, this research is divided into two experiments, finding
a software configuration for the system that processes BitTorrent packets of interest
as quickly as possible, and expanding the system to incorporate the SIP protocol
without sacrificing overall performance. Each of the two experiments is comprised
of three tests: calculating packet processing time, calculating probability of packet
intercept under a non-peer-to-peer workload, and calculating probability of packet
intercept under an all-peer-to-peer workload. Overviews of the two experiments are
outlined below.
5.1.2.1 Experiment 1: Finding an Optimal Software Configuration.
The first experiment seeks to determine the optimal hardware/software configuration
of the system that processes BitTorrent packets of interest as quickly and as accurately
as possible. This experiment is split into three parts. First, each hardware/software
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configuration is tested against several types of packet sizes and formats, and the
amount of processor time needed to process each packet is examined. Second, a series
of BitTorrent packets of interest are sent to each configuration in a high non-peer-
to-peer network utilization environment, and the overall probability of intercept of a
packet of interest is calculated for each configuration. Finally, a series of BitTorrent
packets is sent to the system at near-full network utilization in order to determine the
probability of intercepting multiple packets of interest in a row.
5.1.2.2 Experiment 2: Expanding the Forensic Tool to Incorporate VoIP
Functionality. The second experiment seeks to determine if adding functionality to
process SIP packets in addition to BitTorrent packets degrades overall system perfor-
mance. For this experiment, the optimal configuration found in the first experiment
is modified to also include detection and processing of SIP packets of interest. As
with the first experiment, this experiment consists of three parts. First, the modi-
fied configuration is tested against several types of BitTorrent and SIP packets, and
the amount of time needed to process each packet is examined. Second, a series of
BitTorrent and SIP packets of interest are sent to the modified configuration in a
high network utilization environment, and the probability of intercept of each type
of packet of interest is calculated. The results of this experiment are then compared
against the results of the first experiment to determine if the system’s overall perfor-
mance in processing BitTorrent packets of interest is negatively impacted. Finally, a
series of peer-to-peer packets is sent to the system at near-full network utilization in
order to determine a measure of the probability of intercepting multiple packets of
interest in a row for each peer-to-peer protocol.
5.2 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the TRAPP Forensic Tool System. A block
diagram of the SUT is shown in Figure 5.3. It consists of the following components:
the TRAPP software, the Power PC processor, the system clock, the Ethernet con-
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Figure 5.3: The TRAPP Forensic Tool System
troller, the Compact Flash card controller, and the RS232 controller. The Component
Under Test (CUT) is the TRAPP software. Specifically, various modifications to the
software execution flow will be compared to the baseline software architecture.
Workload parameters include the type of BitTorrent Packet used, the type of
SIP packet used, and the total network utilization as a percentage of network capacity.
The system parameters consist of the size of the list of interest used by the system,
network speed, the software configuration of the TRAPP system, and the number
and types of peer-to-peer protocols supported by the system. These parameters are
discussed in more detail in Section 5.6. The metrics of the system consist of the time
required to process a packet and the probability of successful intercept of a packet.
5.3 System Services
This system provides a detection and tracking service for certain peer-to-peer
protocols on a local area network gateway to the Internet. The service is success-
ful when a BitTorrent Handshake packet, SIP INVITE packet, or SIP BYE packet
entering the system is detected, its file info hash or SIP URIs extracted and com-
pared against a list of interest, and in the case of a match, its contents copied to
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a Wireshark-compatible log file. The service is a failure when: a packet of interest
is not detected, a packet of interest is detected but the file info hash or SIP URIs
are not extracted correctly, the file info hash or SIP URI is incorrectly determined
to be not on the list, or the packet fails to be copied correctly to the log file. For
this research, the problem of encountering false positives (for example, the file info
hash or SIP URI is determined to be a match to an item on the list, when in fact
it is not) is not considered, as it is assumed that all log files will be reviewed by a
human administrator, who will be able to correctly determine that the packet is not
of interest.
5.4 Workload
The workload of the SUT consists of two parts, the peer-to-peer packets and
the non-peer-to-peer network traffic load. For the two experimental tests, either one
or both of these workload components are used. Outlined below are the specific peer-
to-peer packets used in the tests and a description of how the non-peer-to-peer traffic
is generated.
5.4.1 BitTorrent and SIP Packets Employed. The peer-to-peer packets
employed for the system’s workload consist of BitTorrent Handshake packets and SIP
INVITE and BYE packets that are loaded with specific file info hashes and SIP URIs.
Listed below are the variations of these packets that comprise the peer-to-peer portion
of the workload.
5.4.1.1 BitTorrent Handshake Packet (Hash on the List). To deter-
mine how the system processes packets that belong to the BitTorrent protocol, and
whose file info hashes are contained in the list of interest, a packet capture file contain-
ing a real-world BitTorrent file transfer is analyzed, and the payload of the Handshake
packet used to set up the peer-to-peer connection is extracted. The file info hash con-
tained in the Handshake packet is then added to the list of interest. The contents of
the sample BitTorrent Handshake packet are shown below.
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<13 42 69 74 54 6f 72 72 65 6e 74 20 70 72 6f 74 6f 63 6f 6c
00 00 00 00 00 01 00 01
3f fe ce 46 da 61 36 15 2f 25 59 69 07 4a d9 5b 07 fa 08 75
2d 55 54 31 37 37 30 2d f3 9f b2 53 84 dc 26 f6 32 05 e7 be>
Details on how to interpret the contents of the BitTorrent Handshake packets
presented here are in Section 3.7.
5.4.1.2 BitTorrent Handshake Packet (Hash Not on the List). To
determine how the system processes packets that belong to the BitTorrent protocol,
but whose file info hashes are not on the list of interest, the BitTorrent Handshake
packet from the previous section is modified such that the new file info hash does
not match any entry on the system’s list of interest. As shown in the packet payload
below, the third byte of the file info hash (contained in the third line of the contents)
is changed from 0xCE to 0xAA.
<13 42 69 74 54 6f 72 72 65 6e 74 20 70 72 6f 74 6f 63 6f 6c
00 00 00 00 00 01 00 01
3f fe aa 46 da 61 36 15 2f 25 59 69 07 4a d9 5b 07 fa 08 75
2d 55 54 31 37 37 30 2d f3 9f b2 53 84 dc 26 f6 32 05 e7 be>
5.4.1.3 Non-Peer-to-Peer Packet. To determine how the system pro-
cesses packets that do not belong to one of the two peer-to-peer protocols of interest,
a packet is crafted that does not match the parameters of either protocol. As shown
in the packet payload below, this is accomplished by taking a BitTorrent Handshake
packet and changing the first byte of the payload from 0x13 to 0xAA. This change
guarantees that the packet does not match the format of either a BitTorrent packet or
a SIP packet (the packet does not match any known SIP packet since all SIP packet
payloads are written in HTML, which is an ASCII-based language, and the byte 0xAA
is not a valid ASCII character).
<aa 42 69 74 54 6f 72 72 65 6e 74 20 70 72 6f 74 6f 63 6f 6c
72
00 00 00 00 00 01 00 01
3f fe ce 46 da 61 36 15 2f 25 59 69 07 4a d9 5b 07 fa 08 75
2d 55 54 31 37 37 30 2d f3 9f b2 53 84 dc 26 f6 32 05 e7 be>
5.4.1.4 SIP INVITE Packet (SIP URI on the List). To determine
how the system processes packets that belong to the SIP protocol, and whose TO and
FROM SIP URIs are contained in the list of interest, a packet capture file containing
a real-world SIP phone call setup and teardown is analyzed, and the payload of the
INVITE packet used to set up the phone call is extracted. The SIP URIs contained
in the packet are then added to the list of interest. The contents of the sample SIP
INVITE message header are shown below. Lines 6 and 7 of the payload contain
the sender and receiver SIP URIs (2001@10.1.1.50 and 2002@10.1.1.50) that are
compared against the list of interest.
INVITE sip:2001@10.1.1.50 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.1.1.2:8228;
branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-ab64a6626128d369-1--d87543-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: <sip:2002@10.1.1.2:8228>
To: "2001"<sip:2001@10.1.1.50>
From: "Tester Two"<sip:2002@10.1.1.50>;tag=48662f73
Call-ID: NGM2ZjNmNDkyZGM1NmFmNmUxOGYwZWM5YjU5MTFhMGU.
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, NOTIFY, MESSAGE,
SUBSCRIBE, INFO
Content-Type: application/sdp
User-Agent: X-Lite release 1011s stamp 41150
Content-Length: 408
Further details on the format of the SIP INVITE packet are found in Section 4.3.
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5.4.1.5 SIP INVITE Packet (SIP URI Not on the List). To determine
how the system processes packets that belong to the SIP protocol, but whose TO and
FROM SIP URIs are not on the list of interest, a SIP INVITE packet whose SIP
URIs are on the list of interest is modified such that the new SIP URIs not match
any entry on the experiment’s list of interest. As shown in the SIP message header
below, the first four bytes of the TO and FROM SIP URIs (contained in lines 6 and
7 of the contents) are changed from 2001 and 2002 to 9999, which is not on the list
of interest.
INVITE sip:2001@10.1.1.50 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.1.1.2:8228;
branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-ab64a6626128d369-1--d87543-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: <sip:9999@10.1.1.2:8228>
To: "2001"<sip:9999@10.1.1.50>
From: "Tester Two"<sip:9999@10.1.1.50>;tag=48662f73
Call-ID: NGM2ZjNmNDkyZGM1NmFmNmUxOGYwZWM5YjU5MTFhMGU.
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, NOTIFY, MESSAGE,
SUBSCRIBE, INFO
Content-Type: application/sdp
User-Agent: X-Lite release 1011s stamp 41150
Content-Length: 408
5.4.1.6 SIP BYE Packet (SIP URI on the List). To determine how
the system processes packets that belong to the SIP protocol, and whose TO and
FROM SIP URIs are contained in the list of interest, the same packet capture file
used above to extract the INVITE packet is again analyzed, and the payload of the
BYE packet used to tear down the phone call is extracted. The contents of the sample
SIP BYE message header are shown below.
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BYE sip:2002@10.1.1.50 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.1.1.1:7946;
branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-181b4b34431d0f61-1--d87543-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: <sip:2001@10.1.1.1:7946;rinstance=c1540086ad2a9650>
To: "SANS Student 2"<sip:2002@10.1.1.50>;tag=as1b3919be
From: <sip:2001@10.1.1.1:7946;rinstance=c1540086ad2a9650>;tag=d33db83e
Call-ID: 73a1d1f673e3e4b42cfb4cca38f30aa1@10.1.1.50
CSeq: 2 BYE
User-Agent: X-Lite release 1011s stamp 41150
Reason: SIP;description="User Hung Up"
Content-Length: 0
Further details on the format of the SIP BYE packet are found in Section 4.3.
5.4.2 The Non-Peer-to-Peer Traffic Load. For the probability of intercept
tests in each of the two experiments, a non-peer-to-peer traffic load is used to saturate
the test network to approximately 90 Mbps on the 100 Mbps network. To create the
load, a 1,150,217,528-byte video file, named DFEE-660.avi, is transferred from one
node on the network to another node on the network using the Windows NETBIOS
file transfer protocol. While this transfer is in progress, another node on the network
can transmit peer-to-peer packets of interest into a high-traffic environment.
5.5 Performance Metrics
In order for the system to be effective, it must have a high probability of success-
fully intercepting, processing, and recording those packets on the network that belong
to a peer-to-peer protocol supported by the system, and whose identifiers are on the
lists of interest. By extension, in order for the system to successfully intercept these
packets of interest, it must have the capability to analyze all traffic on a network,
which necessitates the requirement of processing each packet as quickly as possible
for a given set of parameters. Thus, the following performance metrics are defined:
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• Packet Processing Time: The number of CPU cycles, as measured by the Power
PC processor’s System Timer, that are required to accomplish the following:
determine if a packet has been received by Ethernet controller, inspect the packet
for peer-to-peer protocols, match the packet’s identifier against the appropriate
list, record the packet if necessary, and make the Ethernet controller available
to receive another packet entering the system.
• Probability of Packet Intercept : The probability of a packet, whose format
matches a peer-to-peer protocol supported by the system, and whose identi-
fier matches an entry on a list of interest, being successfully recorded in the
system intercept log.
5.6 Parameters
The parameters of the system are the properties which, when changed, impacts
the performance of the system. These include both system parameters, which char-
acterize the system, and workload parameters, which characterize the workload. The
system and workload parameters for the SUT are described below.
5.6.1 System Parameters.
• Size of List of Interest: This is the size of the list of interest, expressed by the
number of entries in the list. For the BitTorrent protocol, an entry is a 160-bit
file info hash, described in Section 3.5.3. For the SIP protocol, an entry is the
first 12 digits of a SIP-URI, described in Section 4.2. Because the system uses
a binary search algorithm to perform the hash/SIP URI matching process, each
doubling of the list size will add a maximum of one comparison to the total
algorithm execution time. For this research, a sample list size of 1000 entries is
used for both the file info hash list and the SIP URI list.
• Network Speed: This is the maximum speed of network data entering the system
through the Ethernet connection. The Ethernet controller on the Xilinx II Pro
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board used in this research is capabable of connecting to either a 10 Mbps or a
100 Mbps network. For this research, the 100 Mbps connection option is used.
• TRAPP Software Configuration: The software code used to execute TRAPP
functions using the Power PC processor on the FPGA. As procedures and fea-
tures contained in the software are added, removed, or modified, the overall
functions and performance of the system are affected. A full description of each
configuration used in the TRAPP system is contained in Section 5.7.
• Peer-to-Peer Protocols Supported: This is the set of peer-to-peer protocols that
the system is capable of detecting and analyzing. For the first experiment, the
BitTorrent protocol is the only member of this set. In the second experiment,
the Session Initiation Protocol is added to the set.
5.6.2 Workload Parameters.
• BitTorrent Packet Type: In this study, three different types of BitTorrent pack-
ets are used: a BitTorrent Handshake packet whose file info hash matches an
entry on the list of interest, a BitTorrent Handshake packet whose file info hash
does not match an entry on the list of interest, and a packet that is not a prop-
erly formatted BitTorrent Handshake packet. For a complete description of the
packets, see Section 5.4.1.
• SIP Packet Type: Three different types of SIP packets are used in this study:
a SIP INVITE packet whose TO and FROM SIP URIs match an entry on the
list of interest, a SIP INVITE packet whose TO and FROM SIP URIs do not
match an entry on the list of interest, and a SIP BYE packet whose TO and
FROM SIP URIs match an entry on the list of interest. A complete description
of the packets is in Section 5.4.1.
• Network Utilization: This is the total amount of traffic entering the system.
For the first test, the network utilization is limited to single packets injected
into the system to measure the time required to fully process the packet. For
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the second test, a load of between 89.6 Mbps and 89.7 Mbps is injected into
the system, which equates to approximately a 90% utilization of the 100 Mbps
Ethernet connection. For the third test, a continuous stream of identical peer-to-
peer packets of interest is injected into the system, with the network utilization
varying with the type of peer-to-peer packet.
5.7 Factors
This section outlines the factors selected from the system and workload parame-
ters. These factors are varied in Experiment 1 to determine the software configuration
that returns the best performance in processing various types of BitTorrent packets.
They are varied in Experiment 2 to measure the impact on performance of adding
a second peer-to-peer protocol to the optimal configuration found in Experiment 1.
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 summarize the factors chosen and their levels for the two
experiments.
Table 5.1: Factor Levels for Experiment 1
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
Configuration Control User Alerts Dual Buffer Packet Write Cache Combined
Packet Type Non-P2P BT On List BT Off List
Table 5.2: Factor Levels for Experiment 2
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
Configuration Optimized
(BT + SIP)
Packet Type Non-P2P BT BT SIP INVITE SIP INVITE SIP BYE
On List Off List On List Off List On List
5.7.1 Configuration. The software configuration is the factor designated
as the Component Under Test. It controls all aspects of the system, including what
information is provided to the user, how network data is captured and analyzed, and
how packets of interest are stored. The six levels chosen for this factor are detailed
below.
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5.7.1.1 Control Configuration. In order to design and build a proto-
type as quickly as possible, the system is initially implemented as an embedded soft-
ware application using the Power PC core on the Virtex II Pro FPGA development
board. Xilinx-provided drivers and built-in functions are used where possible, with
custom software built to accomplish the following functions: read the data file con-
taining the file info hashes of the list of interest, perform packet payload inspections,
copy BitTorrent Handshake frames to on-chip RAM, perform the hash matching, and
write the frame data to the log file on the Compact Flash card.
Listed below are the salient features of the Control configuration:
• All modules are executed in software. The only hardware modification made
is to enable the Ethernet controller to operate in promiscuous mode (see Sec-
tion A.3 for details).
• To simplify the software code as much as possible, the Ethernet controller is
limited to one receive buffer, caching is not used, and no user alerts are generated
for the user.
• Packets of interest are copied three times. The first copy is from the Ethernet
controller buffer to block RAM upon detection of the 32-bit BitTorrent signature
in the packet’s payload. If the file info hash is found on the list, the frame is
copied from RAM to a character array, and then from the array to the log file
on the Compact Flash card.
• Frames are copied to the Compact Flash card as they are processed. The system
waits until the current frame has been completely processed and sent to the
Compact Flash card before beginning to process another frame.
5.7.1.2 User Alerts Configuration. This modification adds to the
system user notifications, via the serial port and HyperTerminal, of any peer-to-peer
control packets that are found by the system. The messages consist of the type of
peer-to-peer packet found, whether the file info hash matches an entry on the list of
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interest, and the file info hash’s position on the list of interest. Because the serial port
runs at a much lower speed than the CPU and the processing bus, it is hypothesized
that sending any data over the RS232 connection causes a dramatic slowdown in
overall processing time.
5.7.1.3 Packet Write Configuration. In this modification, all captured
packets of interest are stored within a RAM block instead of writing them individually
to the Compact Flash card. When the system is shut down, all data is then transferred
from the block RAM to the Compact Flash card. By storing the data within RAM,
the only write functions to the Compact Flash card are performed before packet
sniffing begins and after packet sniffing terminates. It is hypothesized that writing to
the Compact Flash card is a high-latency process, and that its removal will result in
a significant processing time savings.
5.7.1.4 Dual Buffer Configuration. This modification adds a second
receive buffer to the Ethernet controller [Pro06]. This allows one frame to be read
and processed while another frame is received. The goals for this optimization are to
give the comparison and copying routines additional time to execute, and limit the
number of frames dropped due to a full receive buffer.
5.7.1.5 Cache Configuration. This modification enables the instruc-
tion and data caches for the Power PC processor. By allowing the FPGA to cache
processor instructions, heap data, and stack data instead of performing multiple reads
and writes to block RAM, a significant amount of processing time should be saved.
5.7.1.6 Combined Configuration. This is the combined case of the
CUT incorporating the Packet Write, Dual Buffer, and Cache optimizations into a
single system. The goal for the integration is to take advantage of each optimization
individually and to possibly gain synergistic time savings from the combination of all
four optimizations.
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5.7.2 Packet Type. This is the format, protocol, and size of the packets
entering the system. A sufficient cross section of peer-to-peer packet sizes and types
are crucial to determining how the system will process various packets of interest and
packets not of interest. The six levels chosen for this factor are listed below. Detailed
descriptions of each packet format are found in Section 5.4.1.
• Non-Peer-to-Peer Packet
• BitTorrent Handshake Packet On the List of Interest
• BitTorrent Handshake Packet Not On the List of Interest
• SIP INVITE Packet On the List of Interest
• SIP INVITE Packet Not On the List of Interest
• SIP BYE Packet On the List of Interest
Note that since a SIP BYE Packet Not on the List of Interest and a SIP INVITE
Packet Not on the List of Interest will be treated the same by the system, this type
of SIP BYE packet is not included as a factor level. Except for the first line of the
message header, each packet has identical header contents, and since the SIP URI of
neither packet is on the list, neither frame will be copied by the system to the log file.
Thus, the two packet types will be processed identically by the system.
5.8 Evaluation Technique and Environment
5.8.1 Experimental Environment. To conduct the two experiments out-
lined in Section 5.1.2, the experimental setup shown in Figure 5.4 is created. The
experimental environment consists of the following components:
• One Cisco Catalyst 2900XL 100 Mbps switch, configured with 22 standard ports
and 2 spanning ports.
• Two Dell Inspiron Windows XP Service Pack 2 laptops loaded with uTorrent
1.7.7 [uTo08], a popular BitTorrent client, and X-Lite 3.0 [Cor08], a popular
VoIP phone client, and connected to the switch.
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Figure 5.4: Block Diagram of the Experimental Setup
• One Dell Inspiron laptop that is dual-equipped with the BackTrack 2.0 Linux
environment [RE08] and Windows XP Service Pack 2, and is connected to the
switch. The BackTrack environment contains the Hping 3.0.0 [Hpi08] utility,
which is used to inject the crafted BitTorrent and SIP packets. The Windows
environment contains the VMWare 2.0.5 [VMW08] utility to run a TrixBox
2.2 [Tri08] SIP proxy and registrar server for use with the X-Lite clients.
• One Virtex II Pro FPGA system (the SUT), which is connected to a spanning
port on the switch.
• One Dell Inspiron Windows XP Service Pack 2 laptop loaded with Wireshark
1.0.1 [Wir08], which is connected to a second spanning port as a control packet
sniffer.
• One Dell Windows XP Service Pack 2 laptop, which is connected to the SUT
and is used to configure and load the Virtex II Pro via USB port. The laptop
is also equipped with TTermPro [Pro08a], a HyperTerminal application used to
receive alerts from the SUT via RS232 serial port.
The actual setup used in the experiments is shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Experimental Setup for the Three Performance Tests
5.8.2 Evaluation Techniques. Outlined below are the tests used for collecting
data on the packet processing time and probability of packet intercept metrics for each
experiment.
5.8.2.1 Calculating Packet Processing Time. The first test consists
of a series of packets sent from the Linux laptop to one of the Windows laptops via
the Cisco switch. For each run, a series of 50 crafted packets are sent, and the CPU
cycles needed by the system to process each packet is recorded. The crafted packets
are described in detail in Section 5.4.1.
A total of 50 identical packets are sent one second apart through the network.
Based on the testing of several different sample sizes, 50 packets is the minimum sam-
ple size that results in sufficiently small confidence intervals to perform a meaningful
comparison between system configurations. To ensure the independence of each trial,
one second is chosen as the interarrival interval. To determine the number of cycles
required to process each packet received by the system, a Power PC System Timer
time stamp is taken prior to the beginning of the processing, and another time stamp
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is taken immediately after the processing routine ends. To compute the number of
cycles required to process the packet, the two values are simply subtracted from each
other. Since the Power PC processor in the SUT is configured to run at 300 MHz,
to convert the processing time from clock cycles to standard time units, the formula
(time = cycles/300) is used, where cycles is the number of cycles as determined by
the System Timer and time is the time to process the packet in microseconds.
5.8.2.2 Calculating Probability of Intercept Under a Non-Peer-to-Peer
Load. The second test consists of a series of packets sent from the Linux laptop
to one of the Windows laptops via the Cisco switch. For this test, however, an
additional non-peer-to-peer traffic load, as described in Section 5.6.2, is generated on
the network. For this test, the number of crafted packets successfully intercepted and
processed by the system is recorded. The crafted packets used by the Linux laptop
are described in detail in Section 5.4.1.
For each test, a series of three hundred crafted packets are injected into the
network 500 milliseconds apart. By injecting the packets 500 milliseconds apart, the
results of each trial (either the packet was captured or not captured) are assured to
be independent of each other. Based on the testing of several different sample sizes,
300 packets is a good sample size to produce a binomial distribution that results in
sufficiently small confidence intervals to perform a meaningful comparison between
system configurations. Again, to ensure the independence of each trial, i.e., to ensure
that the system is not processing one crafted packet when another one arrives at the
system, the packets are sent 500 milliseconds apart.
When performing this test, another important parameter is the network uti-
lization or network load, defined in Section 5.4. To determine the minimum overall
network load, the Wireshark utility on the laptop that is connected to the second
spanning port is used to analyze all traffic sent during the test. At the conclusion of
the test, a capture summary is extracted by selecting the Statistics -> Summary
menu option, and recording the Average MBit/sec field from the Captured column.
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Because Wireshark itself may not capture all packets on the network, this value is
assumed to be the minimum network traffic load.
5.8.2.3 Calculating Probability of Intercept Under an All-Peer-to-Peer
Load. The third test also consists of a series of packets sent from the Linux laptop
to one of the Windows laptops via the Cisco switch. As in the first test, a series
of crafted packets, described in detail in Section 5.4.1, are sent across the network.
However, for this test, the packets are sent as quickly as possible from the Linux
laptop using the Hping --flood switch.
In order to determine how many packets were sent by the Linux laptop, a
particular feature of the Hping program is exploited. When the Hping program sends
a series of packets, each packet contains a different source port, and the source port
number is incremented by one each time a packet is transmitted. Thus, for a given
series of packets, the total number of packets sent in the series can be calculated by
subtracting the first packet’s source port number from the last packet’s source port
number.
In this test several thousand packets are sent over the network as quickly as
possible using Hping, and the flood is then terminated manually. To determine the
probability of packet intercept, the following procedure is used:
1. Inspect the capture log file and record the number of frames successfully cap-
tured by the system.
2. Record the source port number of the first packet in the log file, and the source
port number of the last packet in the log file.
3. Apply the formula
P (packet intercept) =
number of packets in log
Port(last packet) − Port(first packet)
(5.1)
to compute the probability of packet intercept.
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When performing this test, another important parameter is the network uti-
lization or network load, defined in Section 5.6.2. To determine the minimum overall
network load, the Wireshark utility on the laptop that is connected to the second
spanning port is used to analyze all traffic sent during the test. At the conclusion of
the test, a capture summary is extracted by selecting the Statistics -> Summary
menu option, and recording the Average MBit/sec field from the Captured column.
Because Wireshark itself may not capture all packets on the network, this value is
assumed to be the minimum network traffic load.
5.9 Experimental Design
The overall experimental design for this study consists of two experiments, each
with a partial-factorial design with factor levels selected from Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The
overall design consists of a total of 3,900 trials, where each trial consists of a crafted
test packet sent through the network to the SUT. Details of the trial distribution
between the tests of each experiment are outlined below.
5.9.1 Experiment 1: Finding an Optimal Configuration. The first experi-
ment, Finding an Optimal Software Configuration, consists of 900 packets (6 config-
urations * 3 workloads * 50 packets) sent to the experimental setup to compute the
packet processing times and 1,800 packets (6 configurations * 1 workload * 300 pack-
ets) sent to the setup to compute the probability of packet intercept for a non-peer-to-
peer workload. To compute the probability of packet intercept for an all-BitTorrent
workload, several hundred packets are sent for each of the six configurations and the
“BT On List” packet type.
The configurations and workloads for this experiment are given in Table 5.1.
For the packet processing time test, all configuration and workload factor levels are
used. For the probability of packet intercept (non-peer-to-peer workload) test, all six
configurations and the “BT On List” packet type are used. For the probability of
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packet intercept (all-BitTorrent workload) test, all six configurations and the “BT On
List” packet type are used.
5.9.2 Experiment 2: Expanding the System. The second experiment, Ex-
panding the Tool to Incorporate VoIP, consists of 300 packets (1 configuration *
6 workloads * 50 packets) sent to the experimental setup to compute the packet pro-
cessing times and 900 packets (1 configuration * 3 workloads * 300 packets) sent to
the setup to compute the probability of packet intercept. To compute the probability
of packet intercept for an all-peer-to-peer workload, several hundred packets will be
sent for each of the 3 peer-to-peer packet types.
The configurations and workloads for this experiment are given in Table 5.2.
For the packet processing time test, all six workload factor levels are used. For the
probability of packet intercept (non-peer-to-peer workload) test, the “BT On List”,
“SIP INVITE On List”, and “SIP BYE On List” packet types are used. For the
probability of packet intercept (all-peer-to-peer workload) test, the “BT On List”,
“SIP INVITE On List”, and “SIP BYE On List” packet types are used.
5.10 Analysis and Interpretation of Results
5.10.1 Experiment 1: Finding an Optimal Configuration. The analysis of
this experiment consists of performing a series of one-variable statistical computa-
tions and two-variable comparison tests to prove or disprove the hypothesis that a
system equipped for a single peer-to-peer protocol (in this case, BitTorrent) can be
constructed and optimized such that a packet of interest is detected and recorded
with at least 95% probability. In addition, by analyzing the results of the probability
of packet intercept (all-peer-to-peer workload) test for each configuration, a figure of
merit is calculated for the probability of successfully intercepting multiple sequential
packets of interest on a high utilization network.
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5.10.1.1 Calculating Packet Processing Time. For each combination
of CUT configuration and workload, a one variable t-test is performed to determine
the mean packet processing time in CPU cycles, the standard deviation, the standard
error of the mean, and a 95% confidence interval for the mean. Then, for each
workload, the mean packet processing time of each CUT configuration is compared
to the packet processing time of the Control configuration, and the reasons for any
increase or decrease in processing time is analyzed.
5.10.1.2 Calculating Probability of Intercept Under Non-Peer-to-Peer and
All-Peer-to-Peer Loads. For the configuration and workload combinations outlined
in Section 5.9.1, a one proportion confidence interval analysis is performed on the bi-
nomial variable to determine the probability of packet intercept and a 95% confidence
interval for the proportion. This generates a series of basic statistics from which to
perform the two proportion hypothesis testing.
Next, a one-sided statistical hypothesis test using two proportions and a 95%
confidence interval is performed for each of the five modification CUT configurations
against the Control configuration. The results of these hypothesis tests determine
which of the modification CUT configurations show statistically significant improve-
ment over the Control configuration.
Finally, a one-sided statistical hypothesis test using two proportions and a 95%
confidence interval is performed for the Combined configuration against the other four
modification CUT configurations and against the Wireshark software-based packet
sniffer. The results of these hypothesis tests determine if the improvement of the
combined software configuration over each individual modification is statistically sig-
nificant, and also determine if the hardware-based SUT is at least as effective as the
software-based Wireshark system in intercepting single BitTorrent packets in a heavy
non-peer-to-peer traffic environment and back-to-back BitTorrent packets of interest.
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5.10.2 Experiment 2: Expanding the System. The analysis of this exper-
iment consists of performing a series of one-variable statistical computations and
two-variable comparison tests to prove or disprove the hypothesis that the system
can be expanded to include a second peer-to-peer protocol (in this case, SIP) while
maintaining at least a 95% probability of intercept for a packet of interest from either
peer-to-peer protocol. By analyzing the results of the probability of packet intercept
(all-peer-to-peer workload) test for each workload, a figure of merit is calculated for
the probability of successfully intercepting multiple sequential packets of interest on
a high utilization network.
5.10.2.1 Calculating Packet Processing Time. For each combination
of CUT configuration and workload, a one variable t-test is performed to determine
the mean packet processing time in CPU cycles, the standard deviation, the standard
error of the mean, and a 95% confidence interval for the mean. Then, for the “Non-
P2P”, “BT On List”, and “BT Off List” packet types, the mean packet processing time
of the Optimized (BT + SIP) configuration is compared to the packet processing time
of the Combined configuration from Experiment 1, and the reasons for any increase
or decrease in processing time are analyzed.
5.10.2.2 Calculating Probability of Intercept Under Non-Peer-to-Peer and
All-Peer-to-Peer Loads. For the configuration and workload combinations outlined
in Section 5.9.2, a one proportion confidence interval analysis is performed on the bi-
nomial variable to determine the probability of packet intercept and a 95% confidence
interval for the proportion. This generates a series of basic statistics from which to
perform the two proportion hypothesis testing.
Then, a one-sided statistical hypothesis test using two proportions and a 95%
confidence interval is performed for the Optimized (BT + SIP) configuration from
Experiment 2 against the Combined configuration from Experiment 1. The result of
this hypothesis test determines if there is any statistical difference in the probability
of packet intercept of single BitTorrent packets in a heavy non-peer-to-peer traffic
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environment and back-to-back BitTorrent packets of interest, when the system is
expanded to included SIP functionality.
5.11 Summary
This chapter discusses the methodology used to evaluate the performance of
the digital forensic tool under various workloads and network utilization scenarios.
Performance is evaluated using a real-world experimental design and is based on two
performance metrics: packet processing time and probability of packet intercept. Two
partial-factorial experiments using three different tests are performed to measure the
impact of varying the software configuration and the peer-to-peer input workload on
overall system performance. An analysis is then performed on the data through a
series of statistical tests to determine the effectiveness of the system using various
configurations and workloads.
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VI. Results and Analysis
This chapter presents and analyzes the experimental results. First, the resultsfor each of the performance metrics for the three tests used in Experiment 1 are
discussed in Section 6.1. Next, the results of the performance metrics for the three
tests in Experiment 2 are presented in Section 6.2. Finally, an overall analysis of the
results is given in Section 6.3.
6.1 Results and Analysis of Experiment 1
6.1.1 Test 1: Calculating Packet Processing Time. The first test performed
on the system is used to determine how many CPU cycles are required to process each
type of packet. Outlined below are the results of the Calculating Packet Processing
Time test for each of the three packet type factors listed in Table 5.1.
6.1.1.1 Non-Peer-to-Peer Packet Workload. Table 6.1 shows the re-
sults of a one-variable t-test performed on each of the six configurations using the
Non-Peer-to-Peer (labeled “Non-P2P” in Table 5.1) packet type. The table gives the
number of trials, the mean number of CPU cycles required to process the non-peer-
to-peer packet, the standard deviation, the standard error of the mean, and a 95%
confidence interval for the mean.
Table 6.1: Packet Processing Times for Non-BitTorrent Packets
Configuration N Mean Standard Standard Error Confidence Interval
(Events) Deviation of the Mean (95%)
Control 50 1206.00 0.00 0.00 (1206.00, 1206.00)
User Alerts 50 1152.00 0.00 0.00 (1152.00, 1152.00)
Dual Buffer 50 1344.00 109.10 15.40 (1313.00, 1375.00)
Packet Write 50 1146.00 0.00 0.00 (1146.00, 1146.00)
Cache 50 276.00 0.00 0.00 (276.00, 276.00)
Combined 50 303.50 25.76 3.64 (296.18, 310.82)
Looking at the table, the initial assumption would be that only two of the six
configurations, Dual Buffer and Combined, are stochastic processes. The other four,
Control, User Alerts, Packet Write, and Cache, are all deterministic, as shown by
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the null values for standard deviation and standard error of the mean. However,
looking closer at the raw data, contained in Appendix B, the packet processing times
in the Dual Buffer and Combined configurations in fact alternate between two values,
which shows that these too, are deterministic processes. Thus, when processing non-
peer-to-peer packets, every configuration results in a deterministic packet processing
time.
Figure 6.1 shows 95% confidence interval plots of the packet processing time
required for a packet that does not belong to the BitTorrent protocol. The number
of cycles required ranges from 276 cycles to 1,344 cycles, which equates to a range of
0.92 to 4.48 microseconds per packet.
Looking at both the table and the figure, the following qualitative observations
are noted:
• Enabling the User Alerts has no negative impact on packet processing time over
the Control configuration. This is due to the fact that no alerts are generated
when a non-peer-to-peer packet is processed.
• Adding a second receive buffer adds additional processing time to the Control
configuration baseline. This is due to the additional software processing required
to process packets from two receive buffers instead of one.
• Employing the alternate packet writing scheme has very little positive impact
(less than 5%) on packet processing time over the Control configuration. This
is due to the fact that nothing is written to the log file when a non-peer-to-peer
packet is processed.
• A significant number of cycles are saved by enabling the instruction and data
caches.
• The packet processing time for the Combined configuration is greater than that
of the Cache configuration due to the Combined configuration incorporating
the Dual Buffer Optimization, while the Cache configuration employs a single
receive buffer.
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Figure 6.1: Interval Plots of Packet Processing Times for Non-BitTorrent Packets
6.1.1.2 BitTorrent Packet Not On the List Workload. Table 6.2 shows
the results of a one-variable t-test performed on each of the six configurations using
the BitTorrent Packet Not On the List (labeled “BT Off List” in Table 5.1) packet
type. The table gives the number of trials, the mean number of CPU cycles required
to process the BitTorrent Handshake packet, the standard deviation, the standard
error of the mean, and a 95% confidence interval for the mean.
Table 6.2: Packet Processing Times for BitTorrent Packets Not On the List
Configuration N Mean Standard Standard Error Confidence Interval
(Events) Deviation of the Mean (95%)
Control 50 7296.00 0.00 0.00 (7296.00, 7296.00)
User Alerts 50 1044756 730 103 (1044549, 1044963)
Dual Buffer 50 7770.00 0.00 0.00 (7770.00, 7770.00)
Packet Write 50 7593.00 0.00 0.00 (7593.00, 7593.00)
Cache 50 1145.00 0.00 0.00 (1145.00, 1145.00)
Combined 50 1205.00 0.00 0.00 (1205.00, 1205.00)
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Looking at the table and the raw data, only one of the six configurations, User
Alerts, is a stochastic process. The other five, Control, Dual Buffer, Packet Write,
Cache, and Combined, are all deterministic, as shown by the null values for standard
deviation and standard error of the mean. Thus, for BitTorrent traffic containing
file info hashes that are not on the list of interest, the only configuration that does
not result in a deterministic packet processing time is the User Alert configuration.
The primary reason for the stochastic nature of the User Alert Configuration is that
information sent to the user via RS232 port is subject to processor bus contention
issues on the FPGA board, resulting in a variable transmission time.
Figure 6.2 shows 95% confidence interval plots of the packet processing time
required for a packet that does not belong to the BitTorrent protocol. The number
of cycles required ranges from 1,145 cycles to 7,770 cycles, which equates to a range
of 3.82 to 25.90 microseconds per packet.
Looking at both the table and the figure, the following qualitative observations
are noted:
• Enabling the User Alerts results in a significant increase in packet processing
time, due to the slow rate of RS232 data transmission compared to CPU speed.
Because the packet processing time penalty for enabling User Alerts is so high,
for clarity purposes, the User Alerts configuration does not appear in the figure.
• Adding a second receive buffer adds additional processing time to the Control
configuration baseline. This is due to the additional software processing required
to process packets from two receive buffers instead of one.
• Employing the alternate packet writing scheme has very little negative impact
(less than 5%) on packet processing time over the Control configuration. This is
due to the fact that nothing is written to the log file when a BitTorrent packet
that is not of interest is processed.
• A significant number of cycles are saved by enabling the instruction and data
caches.
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Figure 6.2: Interval Plots of Packet Processing Times for BitTorrent Packets Not
On the List
• The packet processing time for the Combined configuration is greater than that
of the Cache configuration due to the Combined configuration incorporating
the Dual Buffer Optimization, while the Cache configuration employs a single
receive buffer.
6.1.1.3 BitTorrent Packet On the List Workload. Table 6.3 shows the
results of a one-variable t-test performed on each of the six configurations using the
BitTorrent Packet On the List (labeled “BT On List” in Table 5.1) packet type. The
table gives the number of trials, the mean number of CPU cycles required to process
the BitTorrent Handshake packet, the standard deviation, the standard error of the
mean, and a 95% confidence interval for the mean.
Looking at the table, the initial assumption would be that all six configura-
tions are stochastic processes. However, looking closer at the raw data, contained
in Appendix B, the packet processing time in the Packet Write configuration in fact
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Table 6.3: Packet Processing Times for BitTorrent Packets On the List
Configuration N Mean Standard Standard Error Confidence Interval
(Events) Deviation of the Mean (95%)
Control 50 116207 22418 3170 (109836, 122578)
User Alerts 50 1702125 22880 3236 (1695623, 1708628)
Dual Buffer 50 118986 22391 3167 (112623, 125350)
Packet Write 50 23292 318 45 (23202, 23382)
Cache 50 14679 2064 292 (14093, 15266)
Combined 50 3783 75 11 (3762, 3805)
alternates between two values, which shows that this is actually a deterministic pro-
cess. Thus, when BitTorrent packets are processed and then written to a log file,
every configuration save one results in a variable packet processing time.
Figure 6.3 shows 95% confidence interval plots of the packet processing time
required for a BitTorrent Handshake packet whose file info hash is on the list of
interest. The number of cycles required ranges from 3,783 cycles to 118,986 cycles,
which equates to a range of 12.61 to 396.62 microseconds per packet.
Looking at both the table and the figure, the following qualitative observations
are noted:
• Enabling the User Alerts results in a significant increase in packet processing
time, due to the slow rate of RS232 data transmission versus CPU speed. Again,
for clarity purposes, the User Alerts configuration does not appear in the figure.
• Adding a second receive buffer adds a small amount of additional processing
time to the Control configuration baseline. This is due to the additional software
processing required process frames from two receive buffers instead of one.
• Writing the frame to on-board RAM instead of the Compact Flash card, as is
done in the Packet Write optimization, reduces the packet processing time by
approximately 80% over the Control configuration.
• A significant number of cycles are saved by enabling the instruction and data
caches.
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Figure 6.3: Interval Plots of Packet Processing Times for BitTorrent Packets On
the List
• The packet processing time for the Combined configuration is now much less
than that of the Cache configuration. This is due to the large packet processing
time reduction of the Packet Write and Cache optimizations outweighing the
small packet processing time increase of the Dual Buffer optimization.
6.1.2 Test 2: Calculating Probability of Intercept Under a Non-Peer-to-Peer
Load. Table 6.4 shows the results of the packet intercept test under a heavy
non-peer-to-peer network load. For each configuration tested, the number of packets
captured out of the 300 sent is shown. The table also shows the probability of packet
intercept and the corresponding 95% confidence interval for each configuration. In all
tests, the total load on the network is measured by the Wireshark packet sniffer to
be between 89.6 Mbps and 89.7 Mbps, which equates to an 89.6% load on the 100
Mbps network. However, this measurement is not absolute, as the Wireshark program
itself can drop packets under a heavy load. Since it is unknown how many packets
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were dropped by Wireshark, 89.6% is considered to be the minimum load on the test
network.
Table 6.4: Probability of Packet Intercept Under a Non-Peer-to-Peer Workload
Configuration Packets Captured Packets Sent Probability of Confidence Interval
(Events) (Trials) Packet Intercept (95%)
Control 159 300 0.5300 (0.4718, 0.5876)
User Alerts 166 300 0.5533 (0.4951, 0.6105)
Dual Buffer 292 300 0.9733 (0.9481, 0.9884)
Packet Write 174 300 0.5800 (0.5219, 0.6365)
Cache 289 300 0.9633 (0.9353, 0.9816)
Combined 300 300 1.0000 (0.9901, 1.0000)
Wireshark 298 300 0.9933 (0.9761, 0.9992)
Figure 6.4 shows the 95% confidence intervals of probability of packet intercept
for the configurations in Table 6.4. Looking at the table and the figure, while the
User Alerts and Packet Write configurations capture more packets of interest than
the Control (166 and 174 versus 159), the overlapping confidence intervals shown in
the table and figure suggest that the differences are not statistically significant. The
figure and table also show that the Cache and Dual Buffer configurations perform
significantly better than the Control. Moreover, the Combined configuration performs
better than the other five configurations (300 out of 300 packets captured), returning
a test result of 100% probability of packet intercept for packets of interest, which is
comparable to the 99% capture rate of the Wireshark packet sniffer.
To further determine the statistical significance of these results, hypothesis tests
are performed between the various optimizations versus the Control configuration. As
shown in Table 6.5, the p-value for the one-sided test involving the User Alerts and the
Control is too high (0.283) to state with confidence that the increase in probability of
packet intercept is statistically significant. In the one-sided test involving the Packet
Write optimization and the Control, again the p-value is too high (0.109) to accept
the alternative hypothesis, but it can be inferred that the optimization did provide
some improvement to the probability of packet intercept. For the Cache, Dual Buffer,
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Figure 6.4: Interval Plots of Probability of Intercept for a BitTorrent Packet Under
a Non-Peer-to-Peer Workload
and Combined configurations, the p-value for the one-sided test is 0.000, indicating
a strong statistical certainty that these configurations are better than the Control
configuration.
Table 6.5: Hypothesis Testing on Control Configuration Under a Non-Peer-to-Peer
Workload
Alternative Hypothesis with Estimate for Z Value of P Value of
95% Confidence Interval Difference Difference Test Difference Test
p(User Alerts) > p(Control) 0.0233 0.57 0.283
p(Dual Buffer) > p(Control) 0.4433 14.64 0.000
p(Packet Write) > p(Control) 0.0500 1.23 0.109
p(Cache) > p(Control) 0.4333 14.07 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Control) 0.4700 16.31 0.000
To determine the overall performance of the Combined configuration, another
set of hypothesis tests are performed between the Combined configuration versus
the individual optimizations and Wireshark. As shown in Table 6.6, the p-value for
the one-sided tests involving the User Alerts, Packet Write, Cache, and Dual Buffer
99
optimizations ranges between 0.000 and 0.002, indicating a strong statistical certainty
that the Combined configuration is better than each individual optimization by itself.
When the Combined configuration is compared to the performance of Wireshark, the
p-value for the one-sided test is 0.078, which is too high to accept the alternative
hypothesis that the Combined configuration performs better than Wireshark, but
does indicate that the probabilities of packet intercept of the two are comparable.
Table 6.6: Hypothesis Testing on Combined Configuration Under a Non-Peer-to-
Peer Workload
Alternative Hypothesis with Estimate for Z Value of P Value of
95% Confidence Interval Difference Difference Test Difference Test
p(Combined) > p(User Alerts) 0.4467 15.56 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Dual Buffer) 0.0267 2.87 0.002
p(Combined) > p(Packet Write) 0.4200 14.74 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Cache) 0.0367 3.38 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Wireshark) 0.0067 1.42 0.078
6.1.3 Test 3: Calculating Probability of Intercept Under an All-Peer-to-Peer
Load. Table 6.7 shows the results of the packet intercept test under an all-peer-to-
peer network load. For each configuration tested, the number of BitTorrent Handshake
packets that are sent over the network in order for the system to capture 400 of them
is shown in the table. The table also shows the probability of packet intercept and
the corresponding 95% confidence interval for each configuration. In all tests, the
total load on the network is measured by the Wireshark packet sniffer to be between
23.35 and 24.10 Mbps, which equates to approximately a 23.3% load on the 100 Mbps
network. This is the maximum network throughput possible using the Hping utility
and the BitTorrent Handshake workload.
Figure 6.5 shows the 95% confidence intervals of probability of capture for the
configurations in Table 6.7. Looking at the table and the figure, the only configuration
that performs worse than the Control is the User Alerts configuration (3.4% capture
rate for Control versus 1.5% capture rate for User Alerts). The figure and table also
show that the Cache and Dual Buffer configurations perform slightly better than the
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Table 6.7: Probability of Packet Intercept Under an All-Peer-to-Peer Workload
Configuration Packets Captured Packets Sent Probability of Confidence Interval
(Events) (Trials) Packet Intercept (95%)
Control 400 11757 0.0340 (0.0308, 0.0375)
User Alerts 400 26810 0.0149 (0.0135, 0.0164)
Dual Buffer 400 9188 0.0435 (0.0395, 0.0479)
Packet Write 400 990 0.4040 (0.3733, 0.4354)
Cache 400 3599 0.1111 (0.1011, 0.1219)
Combined 400 400 1.0000 (0.9925, 1.0000)
Wireshark 400 404 0.9901 (0.9748, 0.9973)
Figure 6.5: Interval Plots of Probability of Intercept for a BitTorrent Packet Under
an All-Peer-to-Peer Workload
Control, but still are only able to capture less than 12% of packets sent. The Packet
Write configuration performs moderately better than the Control (40.4% versus 3.4%
capture rate), but it is still unable to capture more than 1 in 2 packets. Finally, the
Combined configuration performs significantly better than the other five configura-
tions (400 out of 400 packets captured), returning a test result of 100% probability of
packet intercept and comparing very favorably with Wireshark’s result of 99.0%.
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To further validate the statistical significance of these results, hypothesis tests
are performed between the various optimizations versus the Control configuration. As
shown in Table 6.8, the p-value for the one-sided test involving the User Alerts and
the Control is 1.000, which corresponds to the fact that the User Alerts configuration
actually performed worse than the Control. In the one-sided tests involving the other
four optimizations, the p-value for the one-sided test is 0.000, indicating a strong sta-
tistical certainty that these configurations have a better probability of packet intercept
than the Control configuration.
Table 6.8: Hypothesis Testing on Control Configuration Under an All-Peer-to-Peer
Workload
Alternative Hypothesis with Estimate for Z Value of P Value of
95% Confidence Interval Difference Difference Test Difference Test
p(User Alerts) > p(Control) (0.0191) (10.45) 1.000
p(Dual Buffer) > p(Control) 0.0095 3.51 0.000
p(Packet Write) > p(Control) 0.3700 23.59 0.000
p(Cache) > p(Control) 0.0771 14.02 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Control) 0.9660 577.76 0.000
To determine the overall performance of the Combined configuration, another
set of hypothesis tests are performed between the Combined configuration versus the
individual optimizations and Wireshark. As shown in Table 6.9, the p-value for the
one-sided tests involving the User Alerts, Dual Buffer, Packet Write, and Cache op-
timizations are all 0.000, indicating a strong statistical certainty that the Combined
configuration is better than each individual optimization by itself. When the Com-
bined configuration is compared to the performance of Wireshark, the p-value for the
one-sided test is 0.022, which is low enough to accept, with statistical confidence,
the hypothesis that probability of packet intercept for the Combined configuration is
higher than the probability of packet intercept using Wireshark.
6.1.4 Experiment 1 Analysis. Table 6.10 shows a summary of the results
from the first test, Calculating Packet Processing Time. For each workload, the mean
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Table 6.9: Hypothesis Testing on Combined Configuration Under an All-Peer-to-
Peer Workload
Alternative Hypothesis with Estimate for Z Value of P Value of
95% Confidence Interval Difference Difference Test Difference Test
p(Combined) > p(User Alerts) 0.9851 1330.46 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Dual Buffer) 0.9565 449.29 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Packet Write) 0.5960 38.21 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Cache) 0.8889 169.66 0.000
p(Combined) > p(Wireshark) 0.0099 2.01 0.022
packet processing times and the percentage change from the Control configuration are
recorded in the table.
Table 6.10: Mean Packet Processing Time Comparisons to Control Configuration
Configuration Non-BT Percent BT Packet Percent BT Packet Percent
Packet Change Not on List Change on List Change
(Cycles) (%) (Cycles) (%) (Cycles) (%)
Control 1206 0.00 7296 0.00 116207 0.00
User Alerts 1152 4.48 1044756 (14219.60) 1702125 (1364.74)
Dual Buffer 1344 (11.44) 7770 (6.50) 118986 (2.39)
Packet Write 1146 4.98 7593 (4.07) 23292 79.96
Cache 276 77.11 1145 84.31 14679 87.37
Combined 304 74.83 1205 83.48 9125 92.15
Analyzing the table, the following observations are made about the data col-
lected in the first test:
• For the two BitTorrent packet workloads, messages to the user were sent in the
User Alert configuration, resulting in a several order of magnitude increase in
processing time. This increase is due to the fact that the user alerts are trans-
mitted via serial port at 115,200 baud, which is significantly slower than the
300 MHz processor speed and 100 MHz bus speed used by the FPGA board.
Based on this significant increase in packet processing time, and the correspond-
ing decrease in overall system performance, all user alerts are eliminated from
the final design.
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• Adding a second receive buffer results in more CPU cycles required to process a
packet, regardless of the type of packet. This is due to the additional processing
cycles required to check both receive buffers in order to determine which one
contains the next packet to be processed. However, as shown in the second test,
this increase in CPU cycles is more than offset by the advantages gained by
implementing the second Ethernet receive buffer.
• As expected, the modification to the packet writing routine only decreases the
packet processing time when packets are actually written to the log file. For the
cases where packets are not written, no significant processing time is gained or
lost with this optimization.
• Enabling the caches results in a significant decrease in CPU cycles required to
process a packet, regardless of packet type.
Table 6.11 shows a summary the results from the second test, Calculating Prob-
ability of Intercept Under a Non-Peer-to-Peer Load. For each configuration, the mea-
sured probability of packet intercept and the percentage change from the Control
configuration are recorded in the table. Analyzing the data in this table, combined
with the data in Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6, the following observations are made about
the data collected in the second test:
Table 6.11: Comparison of Probability of Packet Intercept Between Optimizations
and Control Configuration for a Non-Peer-to-Peer Workload
Configuration Probability of Packet Intercept Percent Change from Control
(%)
Control 0.5300 0.00
User Alerts 0.5533 4.40
Dual Buffer 0.9733 83.64
Packet Write 0.5800 9.43
Cache 0.9633 81.76
Combined 1.0000 88.68
Wireshark 0.9933 79.52
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• Adding User Alerts to the system has no statistical impact on the probability of
packet intercept, positive or negative. However, given the vast increase in packet
processing time associated with messages sent to the user (5,673.8 microseconds
with the User Alerts versus 387.4 without User Alerts), their removal is still
justified in the final system design. This point is discussed further in Section 6.3.
• The alternate Packet Writing scheme does not, by itself, significantly improve
overall system performance. However, this optimization, when combined with
other improvements, does provide some benefit to the Combined configuration’s
performance.
• The optimizations that enable the caches and the second receive buffer each have
a significant positive impact on overall system performance. For each optimiza-
tion, system performance increased over 80% from the Control configuration.
• The combination of all three optimizations returned the best performance of
any configuration. Even with the additional processing required to analyze
all packets on the network for the BitTorrent protocol signature, the system
returned similar performance to the dedicated software-based packet sniffer,
Wireshark.
Table 6.12 shows a summary the results from the third test, Calculating Prob-
ability of Intercept Under an All-Peer-to-Peer Load. For each configuration, the
measured probability of packet intercept and the percentage change from the Control
configuration are recorded in the table. Analyzing the data in this table, combined
with the data in Tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9, the following observations are made about
the data collected in the third test:
• Adding User Alerts to the system results in a 56% decrease in performance,
as measured by probability of packet intercept. In this case, the vast increase
in packet processing time associated with messages sent to the user, discussed
above, is almost certainly the root cause of the decrease in performance.
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Table 6.12: Comparison of Probability of Packet Intercept Between Optimizations
and Control Configuration for an All-Peer-to-Peer Workload
Configuration Probability of Packet Intercept Percent Change from Control
(%)
Control 0.0340 0.00
User Alerts 0.0149 (56.18)
Dual Buffer 0.0435 27.94
Packet Write 0.4040 1088.24
Cache 0.1111 226.76
Combined 1.0000 2841.18
Wireshark 0.9901 2812.06
• The Dual Buffer and Cache optimizations, by themselves, modestly improve
system performance, but are still unable to capture more than 50% of packets of
interest. However, combining them with the Packet Write optimization provides
a tremendous benefit to the Combined configuration’s performance.
• The alternate Packet Writing scheme by itself provides a moderate improvement
to overall system performance. The full benefit of this optimization is seen when
combined with caching and an improved Ethernet receive buffer.
• The combination of all three optimizations (Cache, Dual Buffer, and Packet
Write) have a synergistic effect on the overall performance of the system when
processing back-to-back BitTorrent packets. By themselves, each optimization
returned moderate performance gains over the Control configuration. When
combined, however, they created a system that is able to achieve a 100% proba-
bility of packet intercept, which is comparable to the dedicated software packet
sniffer, Wireshark.
Overall, the Combined configuration is clearly the best of the possible configura-
tions for the CUT. The Combined configuration consistently returned very low packet
processing times, indicating that it is able to process a variety of packets faster than
any individual optimization. The Combined configuration also returned the highest
values in both probability of packet intercept tests, indicating that it has a higher
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probability of intercepting packets of interest in both non-peer-to-peer and all-peer-
to-peer workload environments than any of the other optimizations. Finally, using a
95% confidence interval, the Combined configuration returns a minimum capture rate
of 99.0% across all workloads, which is comparable to the performance of Wireshark,
which returned a minimum capture rate of 97.5%.
6.2 Results and Analysis of Experiment 2
6.2.1 Test 1: Calculating Packet Processing Time. Table 6.13 shows the
results of a one-variable t-test performed on the Optimized (BT + SIP) configuration
using six different packet types. The table gives the number of trials, the mean number
of CPU cycles required to process the workload packet, the standard deviation, the
standard error of the mean, and a 95% confidence interval for the mean.
Table 6.13: Packet Processing Times for SIP and BitTorrent Packets Using the
Expanded System
Configuration N Mean Standard Standard Error Confidence Interval
(Events) Deviation of the Mean (95%)
Not P2P 50 418.6 36.0 5.1 (408.4, 428.4)
BT Not on List 50 1323.5 31.8 4.5 (1314.5, 1332.5)
BT Handshake 50 3883.0 85.6 12.1 (3858.7, 3907.4)
SIP Not on List 50 19450.0 97.8 13.8 (19422.2, 19477.8)
SIP BYE 50 29951.3 224.2 31.7 (29887.6, 30015.0)
SIP INVITE 50 34778.6 226.2 32.0 (34714.3, 34842.9)
Looking at the table, the packet processing times for all six packet types are
initially assumed to be stochastic processes. However, looking closer at the raw data,
contained in Appendix B, the packet processing time for the “Non-P2P” packet type
alternates between two values, and the packet processing time for the “BT Off List”
packet type returns the same value for every packet except the first. These results
match those of the first experiment in that the packet processing times are determin-
istic for “Non-P2P” and “BT Off List” packet types in both experiments.
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Figure 6.6: Interval Plots of Packet Processing Times for SIP and BitTorrent Pack-
ets
Figure 6.6 shows 95% confidence interval plots of the packet processing times
required for each of the six packet types. The number of cycles required ranges from
419 cycles to 34,779 cycles, which equates to a range of 1.40 to 115.93 microseconds
per packet, depending on the type of packet.
To compare the original system’s performance from the first experiment against
the system’s performance with the addition of SIP protocol processing capability, hy-
pothesis tests are performed between the Combined configuration from Experiment 1
against the modified Optimized (BT + SIP) configuration from Experiment 2. As
shown in Table 6.14, the p-value for the one-sided tests involving the packet process-
ing times for the “Non-P2P” and “BT On List” packet types is 0.000, which implies
that the addition of SIP protocol processing capability results in increased packet
processing times for both packet types over the BitTorrent-only system.
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Table 6.14: Hypothesis Testing on Expanded System (BitTorrent+SIP) versus the
BitTorrent-Only System
Workload Alternative Hypothesis with Estimate for T Value of P Value of
95% Confidence Interval Difference Difference Test Difference Test
Non-P2P (BT + SIP ) > (Combined) 115.12 18.38 0.000
BT On List (BT + SIP ) > (Combined) 99.80 6.22 0.000
6.2.2 Test 2: Calculating Probability of Intercept Under a Non-Peer-to-Peer
Load. Table 6.15 shows the results of the packet intercept test under a heavy non-
peer-to-peer network load using the modified Optimized (BT + SIP) configuration.
For each of the three peer-to-peer packet types tested, the number of packets captured
by the system out of the 300 sent is shown. For comparison purposes, the number
of packets captured by the Wireshark packet sniffer for each workload is also shown.
In addition, the table shows the probability of packet intercept and the corresponding
95% confidence interval for each workload. In all tests, the total load on the network
is measured by the Wireshark packet sniffer to be between 89.6 Mbps and 89.9 Mbps,
which equates to a minimum 89.6% load on the 100 Mbps network, matching the
results from Experiment 1.
Table 6.15: Probability of Packet Intercept for BitTorrent and SIP Packets Under
a Non-Peer-to-Peer Workload
Workload Packets Captured Packets Sent Probability of Confidence
(Events) (Trials) Packet Intercept Interval (95%)
BT Handshake 300 300 1.0000 (0.9901, 1.0000)
Wireshark BT 298 300 0.9933 (0.9761, 0.9992)
SIP BYE 300 300 1.0000 (0.9901, 1.0000)
Wireshark BYE 300 300 1.0000 (0.9901, 1.0000)
SIP INVITE 298 300 0.9933 (0.9761, 0.9992)
Wireshark INVITE 300 300 1.0000 (0.9901, 1.0000)
Figure 6.7 shows the 95% confidence intervals of probability of packet intercept
for the workloads in Table 6.15. Looking at the table and the figure, the modified
Optimized (BT + SIP) configuration performed perfectly (300 out of 300 packets
captured) for two out of the three workloads, and returned a 99% probability of packet
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Figure 6.7: Interval Plots of Probability of Intercept for BitTorrent and SIP Packets
Under a Non-Peer-to-Peer Workload
intercept for the other. This performance compares very favorably with the results
returned by the Wireshark packet sniffer, which also returned a test result of near-
100% probability of packet intercept for packets of interest.
6.2.3 Test 3: Calculating Probability of Intercept Under an All-Peer-to-Peer
Load. For each of the three all-peer-to-peer workloads (BitTorrent Handshake, SIP
INVITE, and SIP BYE), the total load on the network is measured by the Wireshark
packet sniffer, and the results shown in Table 6.16. The low maximum network load for
the BitTorrent Handshake packet workload is likely due to the fact that the BitTorrent
peer wire protocol runs on top of TCP. Both the exponential backoff mechanism and
the reliable data transfer features of TCP add additional time between packets sent
over the network, causing a decrease in the maximum throughput that the Hping
program can achieve. The SIP INVITE and BYE packets, on the other hand, use
UDP, which allows Hping to achieve a throughput of over 94 Mbps on the 100 Mbps
network.
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Table 6.16: Observed Network Load for Various All-Peer-to-Peer Workloads
Configuration Network Load (Mbps)
BitTorrent Handshake 23.35
SIP BYE 94.61
SIP INVITE 96.28
Table 6.17 shows the results of the packet intercept test under an all-peer-to-
peer network load. For each peer-to-peer packet type tested, the number of workload
packets that were sent over the network in order for the system to capture 400 of
them is shown. For comparison purposes, the number of packets captured by the
Wireshark packet sniffer for each workload is also shown. In addition, the table shows
the probability of packet intercept and the corresponding 95% confidence interval for
each configuration.
Table 6.17: Probability of Packet Intercept for BitTorrent and SIP Packets Under
an All-Peer-to-Peer Workload
Configuration Packets Captured Packets Sent Probability of Confidence
(Events) (Trials) Packet Intercept Interval (95%)
BT Handshake 400 400 1.0000 (0.9901, 1.0000)
Wireshark BT 400 404 0.9901 (0.9748, 0.9973)
SIP BYE 400 440 0.9091 (0.8783, 0.9343)
Wireshark BYE 400 400 1.0000 (0.9901, 1.0000)
SIP INVITE 400 608 0.6579 (0.6187, 0.6956)
Wireshark INVITE 400 401 0.9975 (0.9862, 0.9999)
Figure 6.8 shows the 95% confidence intervals of probability of packet intercept
for the workloads in Table 6.17. Looking at the table and the figure, both the SUT and
Wireshark perform very well under the BitTorrent Handshake packet type, returning
a probability of packet intercept of over 99%. For the SIP BYE packet type, the SUT
returns a probability of packet intercept of just over 90%, while Wireshark returns a
perfect score of 100%. Finally, for the SIP INVITE packet type, the SUT achieves a
65.8% probability of packet intercept, while Wireshark performs much better, returning
a near-perfect score of 99.8%.
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Figure 6.8: Interval Plots of Probability of Intercept for BitTorrent and SIP Packets
Under an All-Peer-to-Peer Workload
6.2.4 Experiment 2 Analysis. Looking at Tables 6.13 and 6.14 the following
observations are made about the data collected in the first test:
• Adding SIP processing capability to the SUT results in a higher packet processing
time for both non-peer-to-peer and BitTorrent Handshake packets. This is due
to the additional processing required by the system to determine if a packet
belongs to either the BitTorrent or SIP protocols, as opposed to looking for
only BitTorrent packets.
• The packet processing time required for any SIP packet is several times longer
than the time required to process BitTorrent packets. The reasons for this
increase in processing time are explained in Section 6.3.
Table 6.18 shows a summary the results from the second and third tests, Cal-
culating Probability of Intercept Under a Non-Peer-to-Peer Load and Under an All-
Peer-to-Peer Load. For each packet type, the measured probability of packet intercept
for the non-peer-to-peer and all-peer-to-peer workloads and the percentage difference
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between the two are recorded in the table. Analyzing the data in this table, combined
with the data in Tables 6.15 and 6.17, the following observations are made about the
data collected in the second and third tests:
Table 6.18: Comparison of Probability of Packet Intercept Between Non-Peer-to-
Peer and All-Peer-to-Peer Workloads
Workload Probability of Probability of Improvement
Packet Intercept Packet Intercept (%)
(Non-Peer-to-Peer) (All-Peer-to-Peer)
BT Handshake 1.0000 1.0000 0.00
Wireshark BT 0.9933 0.9901 (0.32)
SIP BYE 1.0000 0.9091 (9.09)
Wireshark BYE 1.0000 1.0000 0.00
SIP INVITE 0.9933 0.6579 (33.76)
Wireshark INVITE 1.0000 0.9975 (0.25)
• The probability of packet intercept performance of the system is unchanged when
processing BitTorrent Handshake packets. Regardless of whether the SUT is
processing a single BitTorrent Handshake packet amid a high non-peer-to-peer
network load or a steady stream of Handshake packets, the system is able to
achieve a 100% probability of packet intercept. In addition, the SUT performs
slightly better than the Wireshark packet sniffer, regardless of the overall work-
load.
• When processing SIP BYE packets, the SUT sees a 9% decrease in probability
of packet intercept when processing the packets back-to-back over processing a
single packet amid a high non-peer-to-peer network load. The extended packet
processing time required for this type of packet causes the system to occasionally
drop the next frame entering the SUT because it is still processing the current
SIP frame in the Ethernet receive buffer. The Wireshark packet sniffer, however,
returns perfect scores regardless of workload type.
• When processing SIP INVITE packets, the SUT sees a 33.8% decrease in prob-
ability of packet intercept when processing the packets back-to-back over pro-
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cessing a single packet amid a high non-peer-to-peer network load. The reason
for this is the same as that for the SIP BYE packet. However, the SIP INVITE
packet, due to its larger overall packet size, requires a longer packet processing
time than the BYE packet, resulting in a lower probability of packet intercept
than that of the SIP BYE packet. Wireshark, however, does not suffer from this
problem, returning a probability of packet intercept of at least 99.7% for both
workloads.
6.3 Overall Analysis
6.3.1 Analysis of Packet Processing Time. The first step in the research
methodology is to find a system configuration that required the minimum number of
CPU cycles to process packets entering the system. Based on the results presented
here, the most significant improvement to system speed occurs when the data and
instruction caches are enabled for the Power PC processor. By allowing the FPGA
to cache both processor instructions and heap and stack data, packet processing
time is reduced by 77% to 87%, depending on the type of packet. In addition, by
delaying the Compact Flash write operations until after the termination of system
processing, the packet processing time is reduced by 80% for packets written to the log
file. When all four optimizations are combined, the resulting Combined configuration
achieves a 75% to 92% reduction in processing time of packets of interest over the
Control configuration, depending on the type of packet. Therefore, the Combined
configuration is confirmed to be the best system configuration for minimizing the
overall packet processing time for all packets entering the system.
When the ability to process SIP packets is added to the system, the mean packet
processing time required to process non-peer-to-peer packets increases by 115 cycles
(0.38 microseconds) and the time required to process BitTorrent Handshake packets
increases by 100 cycles (0.33 microseconds). This increase in packet processing time
is due to the additional software code required to check each packet for the signature
of a SIP control packet as well as the signature of a BitTorrent Handshake packet.
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One significant finding in this portion of the research is the vastly increased
packet processing time required for SIP packets over BitTorrent Handshake packets.
Using the Combined configuration, the mean packet processing time of SIP BYE and
INVITE packets of interest is between 99.8 and 115.9 microseconds, versus a mean
of 12.9 microseconds for a BitTorrent Handshake packet of interest. There are four
main reasons for this large disparity in packet processing times.
1. Unlike BitTorrent file info hashes, the sender and receiver SIP URIs are not
located at a fixed offset within the packet payload, requiring additional processor
time to search the SIP frame contents and find the numbers.
2. When processing SIP packets, the system has to compare both the sender SIP
URI and the receiver SIP URI against the list of interest, whereas the system
only compares a single file info hash against the list for BitTorrent packets.
3. When performing the list checks, the first 12 bytes of each SIP URI is compared
against the list, while only the first 4 bytes of the BitTorrent file info hash are
compared.
4. SIP packets are generally much larger than BitTorrent Handshake packets, and
thus the system requires more time to copy them. The BitTorrent Handshake
frames used in this research are 122 bytes long, while the SIP BYE and INVITE
frames are 547 and 963 bytes, respectively.
6.3.2 Analysis of Probability of Packet Intercept Under Load. In the first
experiment, the overall goal is to find the configuration that returns the highest proba-
bility of packet intercept for both non-peer-to-peer and all-peer-to-peer workloads. In
the non-peer-to-peer case, where a single BitTorrent packet is sent while the network
is under a heavy NETBIOS file transfer load, the Dual Buffer optimization returns
a capture rate of over 95%, while the single buffer configurations (with the excep-
tion of the Cache configuration, discussed below) all return capture rates of less than
60%. This significant packet loss rate for the single receive buffer configurations is
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likely due to the inability of a non-peer-to-peer frame to be processed and cleared
from the buffer before the BitTorrent Handshake packet arrives at the system. At
100 Mbps, the mandatory inter-frame gap required by the Ethernet protocol results
in a 0.96 microsecond delay between the end of one frame and the beginning of the
next. Since the system processes instructions at 300 MHz, it is able to perform at
most 300 instructions per microsecond. Therefore, because multiple instructions are
required to transfer data from the Ethernet buffer, read the payload contents, and
analyze the data, the system cannot keep up with the data flow, resulting in signifi-
cant packet loss as the system approaches 100% utilization. However, note that the
Cache optimization is the exception to this observation; even with a single buffer,
enabling the caches results in a capture rate of 96%. This is likely due to the fact
that the extremely small processing times provided by the cache enable a packet to
be processed in the short interframe time gap.
Adding a second receive buffer to the Ethernet controller dramatically increases
the probability of packet intercept under a non-peer-to-peer workload, achieving a
97% capture rate even with no other optimizations incorporated. The use of two
receive buffers allows a non-peer-to-peer packet to be processed from one buffer while
the BitTorrent Handshake packet is being received in the second buffer. Specifically,
the additional buffer provides a minimum of 576 additional bit times ((7-byte pream-
ble + 1-byte delimiter + 64-byte minimum frame size) x 8 bits per byte) for the
processing of the non-peer-to-peer frame over the single buffer option [IEE05]. Al-
though this improvement comes at the cost of additional processing cycles, as shown in
Table 6.10, the expanded processing window provided by the second buffer more than
offsets the cost in individual packet processing times. When combined with caching
and the improved packet writing scheme, the infrequency of packets of interest, and
the small likelihood of traffic saturation on the network link, the final Combined con-
figuration allows the system to successfully capture and process all BitTorrent packets
of interest sent into a network with a high non-peer-to-peer traffic load.
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For the situation where BitTorrent Handshake packets are sent to the system
back-to-back, as in the case of the all-peer-to-peer workload, each system optimization
returns a much different probability of packet intercept. Using this workload, only the
Packet Write optimization results in a greater than 40% probability of packet intercept ;
the other three optimizations all return capture rates of less than 15%. These low
capture rates are due to the increased packet processing time required for BitTorrent
packets over non-peer-to-peer packets. When all four optimizations are used together,
the resulting Combined configuration is able to achieve a 100% probability of packet
intercept for BitTorrent Handshake packets that are received back-to-back by the
SUT, which is comparable to the results for the dedicated Wireshark packet sniffer.
One interesting result from this portion of the testing is the fact that the Packet
Write optimization returns a probability of packet intercept that is four times higher
than that of the Cache configuration, yet the packet processing time of the Packet
Write configuration is over double that of the Cache configuration. To resolve this
discrepancy, further testing of the Cache configuration is conducted, and the discovery
made that once several hundred packets from the all-peer-to-peer workload are written
to the Compact Flash card, approximately one in four packets thereafter suffers from
a packet processing time of over 125,000 cycles, which is 10 times greater than the
average packet processing time found in the first experiment. Two possible sources for
this increase are the hardware controller that governs Compact Flash write operations
and the cache system itself. Regardless of the cause, the occasional increase in packet
processing time for the Cache configuration results in a lower overall probability of
packet intercept than the Packet Write configuration, which does not access the cache
or the Compact Flash card while the system is actively processing packets.
When the ability to process SIP packets is added to the system, the overall sys-
tem performance is unchanged when processing single packets of interest under a high
non-peer-to-peer network load. Regardless of peer-to-peer packet type (BitTorrent
Handshake, SIP INVITE, or SIP BYE), the system returns at least a 97.5% proba-
117
bility of packet intercept. This performance is comparable to that of the Wireshark
packet sniffer, which also returned a minimum 97.5% probability of packet intercept.
However, when the system is tasked with processing back-to-back peer-to-peer
packets arriving at near-line speed, the system’s performance depends greatly on
the type of peer-to-peer packets arriving at the SUT. For the BitTorrent Handshake
packet workload, the system still returns a probability of packet intercept of 100%,
which is unchanged from the non-SIP processing system. When processing back-to-
back SIP BYE packets, the probability of packet intercept drops to 90.9%, and when
processing back-to-back SIP INVITE packets, the probability of packet intercept drops
further to 65.8%. These results are expected, since the packet processing time of a
SIP BYE packet is much greater than that of a BitTorrent Handshake packet, and
the packet processing time of a SIP INVITE packet is greater than that of a SIP
BYE packet. Thus, for the case where the system receives back-to-back packets of
interest, the probability of successfully intercepting both packets is at least 90% for
BitTorrent Handshake and SIP BYE packets, and is less than two-in-three for SIP
INVITE packets. In comparison, the Wireshark packet sniffer achieved a probability
of packet intercept of greater than 99% for all three packet types, which is likely due
to the fact that Wireshark does not perform any extraction or comparison of payload
data in the frames it collects.
6.4 Summary
This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected from each of the three
tests that were used in the two experiments. A statistical analysis of the performance
metrics for each test in each experiment is performed. Then, an overall analysis and
discussion of the results from the experiments is provided. The results show that
the Combined configuration processes packets of interest 92% faster than the Control
configuration, and the probability of intercept for BitTorrent Handshake messages
is 99.0%, and the probability of intercept for SIP control packets is 97.6%, under a
network traffic load of at least 89.6 Mbps.
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VII. Conclusions
This chapter presents the overall conclusions drawn from the research. Section 7.1compares each research goal with the experimental results and determines if
the research objectives have been met. The significance of the research is discussed in
Section 7.2. Finally, Section 7.3 provides several recommendations for possible areas
of expansion for this research.
7.1 Conclusions of Research
7.1.1 Goal #1: Construct the TRAPP System. The first goal of this research
is to construct an FPGA-based system that analyzes traffic on a network, detects a
selected peer-to-peer protocol, compares the digital information being shared against
a list of interest, and in the case of a match, records selected control frames from
the peer-to-peer session in a log file. To accomplish this goal, a Virtex II Pro FPGA
system is first modified to accept all network traffic entering its Ethernet controller.
The Power PC processor on the board is then programmed with the peer-to-peer
detection software, the BitTorrent file info hash-matching algorithm, and the log file
writing routine. Finally, a sample list of interest is created and loaded into the board’s
memory. The entire system is tested against a real-world BitTorrent file transfer, and
the successful packet intercept by the system accomplishes the first research goal.
7.1.2 Goal #2: Optimize the System. The second goal of this research is to
optimize the system such that it will be able to detect and record all packets of interest
on the network, even under a heavy network traffic load. Of the five modifications
made to the original system design, the User Alerts modification returns the worst
packet processing times, increasing the system’s processing times between 1,364%
and 14,219% when processing BitTorrent packets. The Combined configuration that
incorporates three different modifications returns the best packet processing times,
decreasing the system’s processing times between 75% and 92%, depending on the
type of packet being processed.
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The five modifications made to the original system design return varying changes
to the probability of packet intercept for packets of interest under a 89.6 Mbps network
load, ranging from an increase of 4.4% for the User Alerts to an increase of 89% for
the Combined configuration over the original system design, further justifying the
Combined configuration’s use for the final optimized design. Using the Combined
configuration, the optimized system is able to capture a packet of interest with a
probability of packet intercept of at least 99.0%, using a 95% confidence interval and
given an 89.6 Mbps network utilization. This exceeds the hypothesized value of a
95% probability of intercept, proving the hypothesis and meeting the second research
goal.
7.1.3 Goal #3: Expand the System. The final goal of this research is to
modify the system to accept an additional peer-to-peer protocol with no impact on
overall performance. Software enabling the system to process SIP control packets is
added, and the entire system is again tested against actual BitTorrent file transfers and
actual VoIP phone calls, verifying its capability to intercept real-world data transfers.
When the system is modified to accept SIP control packets in addition to BitTorrent
Handshake packets, it suffers a minor increase in packet processing time for both non-
peer-to-peer and BitTorrent Handshake packets. In addition, the variable placement
of SIP URIs within SIP control packets leads to an order of magnitude increase in
their packet processing times over those of BitTorrent Handshake packets.
With one exception, across all types of peer-to-peer packets tested, the updated
system is able to capture a packet of interest with a probability of packet intercept
of at least 97.6%, using a 95% confidence interval and given an 89.6 Mbps network
load. However, in the rare case where the updated system is processing packets at a
rate of over 94 Mbps, and it receives two SIP control packets in a row, the probability
of packet intercept decreases to 91% for the second BYE packet and 66% for the
second INVITE packet. With the exception of this rare case, these results exceed
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the hypothesized value of a 95% probability of intercept, conditionally proving the
hypothesis and meeting the final research goal.
7.2 Significance of Research
This research provides the Air Force and other government agencies with a
unique method of detecting and tracking both illicit file sharing and VoIP phone call
patterns. This system differs from other methods of tracking illicit file sharing in that
it is completely passive, meaning the system transmits absolutely no information into
the network being monitored, making it completely invisible to users of the network.
By designing the system to be completely self-contained on a Virtex II Pro FPGA, the
TRAPP system can be easily and inexpensively implemented on any LAN, provided
the system has access to a spanning port on the LAN gateway. The simplicity of
the system and its FPGA-based implementation enable it to run at very high speeds,
ensuring a high probability that a packet of interest is successfully intercepted, even
when monitoring a heavily utilized network. Because the tool operates on a spanning
port of the network gateway, any failure of the TRAPP system will have no negative
impact on the network’s performance. Finally, the system can be easily expanded
to include additional peer-to-peer protocols with minimum impact on overall system
performance.
When fully implemented, the TRAPP system will be an effective weapon in the
fight against child pornography. By focusing on those peer-to-peer file transfers that
involve the sharing of child pornography, the TRAPP system will give investigators
the ability to detect when an illicit file is traversing a network of interest, and allow
them to determine from where in the network the transfer is taking place. The system
will also provide them with proof, in the form of a BitTorrent data transfer request
packet, that the illicit activity is taking place, when it happened, and the address of
the computer used for the transfer.
The TRAPP system also has the unique ability to assist in the identification
and tracking of terrorist cells similar to those involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
121
By tracking VoIP phone conversations based on a list of interest containing SIP URIs
of known terrorists or terror supporters, TRAPP can determine the SIP URIs with
which they are communicating. With these new URIs in hand, authorities can then
attempt to track the source of the SIP client and its registrar server, and determine
the physical location of the terrorists. In addition, the SIP conversations collected can
be aggregated to provide the investigator with a social network of the organization,
and may also provide data on the its command and control structure.
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research
The next logical step for this research is to determine how the system performs
on a more robust network. Specifically, the TRAPP system should next be tested on
a gigabit Ethernet network using a more advanced FPGA board that contains both a
faster processor and a gigabit Ethernet controller. The Virtex 5-series FPGA board
features a higher processor clock speed of 550 MHz versus 300 MHz for the Virtex II,
and contains a gigabit Ethernet controller, making it an excellent choice for the next
iteration of the TRAPP system [Xil08a].
Another area for future research is addressing the encryption and obfuscation
capabilities of peer-to-peer networks. The next version of TRAPP should be able to
detect peer-to-peer control packets that have been obfuscated or encrypted, and the
relevant data extracted. However, the entire digital information transfer need not
be decrypted; simply knowing what digital information is being transferred or what
SIP URIs are being used, which are contained in the protocol’s control packets, is
sufficient for the stated purpose of the TRAPP system.
This research used a relatively small list of interest size of 1000 entries. Future
research should investigate how much larger data sets affect the overall performance
of the TRAPP system. However, the data sets will continue to be limited by the size
of the FPGA’s onboard memory, which necessitated the list size used in the Virtex
II-based system.
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Finally, the system should be considered for use as a tool for countering the
worldwide proliferation of botnets [Ber06]. The TRAPP system could prove to be
an effective detection and tracking system for botnet control messages entering and
leaving a target network, and this should be investigated as a future capability.
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Appendix A. Constructing the System Hardware
This Appendix presents a step-by-step guide to constructing the hardware por-tion of the FPGA-based forensic tool used in this research. Section A.1 gives
an overview of the hardware components used in the construction of the system.
Section A.2 provides a step-by-step guide to creating the system using the Xilinx
Platform Studio software suite. Section A.3 shows how the Ethernet controller is
modified to enable promiscuous mode. Finally, Section A.4 shows how to create the
Wireshark-compatible system clock that is used to timestamp frames that are copied
to the log file.
A.1 Hardware Description
This section describes the major hardware components used by the TRAPP
system. The tool is based on the Xilinx II-Pro Development Board, and all compo-
nent programming and integration is accomplished using the Xilinx Platform Studio
software suite. As shown in Figure A.1, a Power PC core contained on the FPGA
executes the code stored in Block RAM modules, and implements those commands
on other hardware modules that are connected via the Processor Local Bus (PLB).
These components and their functions are detailed below.
A.1.0.1 Microprocessor. The on-chip Power PC 405 processor is used
in this system. The design uses the inherent functionality of the Power PC processor
to access on board Block RAM, implement control bus functions, and provide the
capability for executing software applications.
A.1.1 Block RAM. For this implementation, three 64-kilobyte Block RAM
(BRAM) modules are used. The first block is dedicated exclusively to boot up software
code, data and instruction memory, and the stack and heap. The second block is
dedicated to storage of the lists of interest that are read in from the Compact Flash
card. The third block is dedicated to intermediate storage of captured frames prior
to their transfer to the log file on the Compact Flash card.
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Figure A.1: Hardware Design Block Diagram
A.1.2 XPS EthernetLite Controller. The Intellectual Property (IP) to con-
trol the functions of the board’s Ethernet connection is provided by Xilinx and is used
as the basis for the system’s network interface. The VHDL code for this interface is
modified to allow packet capture for all packets (promiscuous mode), as the Ether-
netLite as designed only supports unicast and broadcast traffic. For details on how
this Xilinx IP was modified, see Section A.3.
A.1.3 System ACE Controller. The Xilinx-provided IP for the System ACE
controller is used to manage and access the Compact Flash removable storage media
for storage and retrieval of data. This element is used both to read the lists of interest
into the system and to write the packet capture log file.
A.1.4 RS232 UART / General Purpose IO Interfaces. Two interfaces are
used to control the functioning of the system and for debugging purposes. Specifically,
the terminal interface is used to alert the user when a packet of interest is detected
by the system, and to display system messages concerning the transfer of data to and
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from the Compact Flash card. The push buttons are used to tell the device to stop
execution and to write the log file from the BRAM to the Compact Flash card.
A.1.5 Custom Hardware Clock. This hardware provides the system with
a clock that is used to time stamp packets of interest when they are written to the
log file. This hardware implementation was added due to the excessive amount of
software processing required to generate a Wireshark-compatible time stamp using
the PowerPC System Timer.
A.2 Configuring Components on the Virtex FPGA Board
This section provides a step-by-step description of how to create the hardware
configuration described above. For this research, Xilinx Platform Studio, release
version 10.1.01 is used.
1. To begin, create a new project by selecting “New Project” from the “File” menu.
In the resulting pop-up window, shown in Figure A.2, select the “Base System
Builder wizard” option and click “OK” to continue.
Figure A.2: The Project Creation Options Window
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2. In the next pop-up window, shown in Figure A.3, name the project file. In the
Advanced Options, check the “Set Project Peripheral Repositories” box, and
type the path to the Virtex II Pro library directory contained on the Drivers
CD included with the Virtex II Pro board. Then click “OK” to continue.
Figure A.3: The Project Creation and Repository Selection Window
3. In the Base System Builder - Welcome window, select “I would like to create a
new design” and click “Next” to continue.
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4. In the Select Board window, shown in Figure A.4, select “Xilinx” in the Board
vendor drop-down menu and “XUP Virtex-II Pro Development System” in the
Board name drop-down menu. Ensure that revision C is shown in the Board
revision drop-down menu, and click “Next” to continue.
Figure A.4: The Select Board Window
5. In the Base System Builder - Select Processor window, select the “Power PC”
radio button, then click “Next” to continue.
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6. In the Configure PowerPC Processor window, shown in Figure A.5, select “300.00”
MHz for the Processor clock frequency and “100.00” MHz for the Bus clock fre-
quency. Ensure that the “FPGA JTAG” radio button is selected in the Debug
I/F section, and that no On-chip memory is selected. Then click “Next” to
continue.
Figure A.5: The Configure PowerPC Processor Window
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7. In the Configure IO Interfaces (1 of 2) window, shown in Figure A.6, select the
boxes for RS232 Uart 1, Ethernet MAC, and SysACE CompactFlash. In the
RS232 section, select “115200” as the Baudrate. Then click “Next” to continue.
Figure A.6: The Configure IO Interfaces (1 of 2) Window
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8. In the Configure IO Interfaces (2 of 2) window, shown in Figure A.7, select the
box for PushButtons 5Bit. Then click “Next” to continue.
Figure A.7: The Configure IO Interfaces (2 of 2) Window
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9. In the Add Internal Peripherals window, shown in Figure A.8, create three
BRAM components by clicking the “Add Peripheral” button and selecting XPS
BRAM IF CNTLR. For each BRAM, ensure the Memory size is set to 64 Kb.
Figure A.8: The Add Internal Peripherals Window
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10. In the Software Setup window, shown in Figure A.9, deselect the Memory test
and Peripheral selftest sample application selections, then click “Next” to con-
tinue.
Figure A.9: The Software Setup Window
11. In the System Created window, verify that the appropriate hardware has been
added, then click “Generate” to complete the hardware construction.
A.3 Modifying the Ethernet Controller
The first piece of custom IP created for the hardware system is the modification
of the Xilinx-provided Ethernet interface to allow it to capture all frames transmitted
across the network. Currently, the XPS EthernetLite drivers only support unicast and
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broadcast frame reception “out of the box.” To force the Ethernet controller to oper-
ate in promiscuous mode, the VHDL code in the EthernetLite’s rx_state_2.vhd
file is modified. The file is found in the
C:\Xilinx\10.1\EDK\hw\XilinxProcessorIPLib\pcores\
xps_ethernetlite_v2_00_a\hdl\vhdl directory. The modifications to the file’s code
are shown in the code segment below:
1 -- Keep these two lines from the original code:
2 bcastAddrGood <= ’1’ when checkingBroadcastAdr_i = ’1’ and
3 Emac_rx_rd_data_d1(0 to 3) = x"F" else ’0’; -- 03-26-04
4
5 -- Add the following line to force the controller to think that all
6 -- non-broadcast frames are unicast:
7 ucastAddrGood <= ’1’ when checkingBroadcastAdr_i = ’0’ else ’0’;
8
9 -- Remove these next two statements...they are no longer needed:
10 -- ucastAddrGood <= ’1’ when checkingBroadcastAdr_i = ’0’ and
11 -- (Emac_rx_rd_data_d1(0 to 3) = Mac_addr_ram_data) else ’0’;--03-26-04
In this modification, line 7 is added to set the “Unicast Address Good” variable
to ’1’ regardless of the actual destination MAC address. The ’1’ value indicates that
that the frame is addressed to this Ethernet controller. Lines 10 and 11, which contain
the original unicast address comparison logic, are then removed.
Though this modification is deceptively simple, a total deconstruction of the
EthernetLite interface driver and receive state machine was required to determine
where the modifications should be made. By telling the receive hardware that every
packet received is a confirmed unicast frame, the Ethernet controller captures every
frame regardless of intended recipient, and passes them up to the software driver.
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A.4 Creating the System Clock
The second piece of custom hardware is the development of a custom hardware
system clock using VHDL. The clock has two main functions, keeping accurate time
in a Wireshark-readable format and updating its clock value when directed by the
system software. The core VHDL implementation of the timer is shown in the code
segment below:
SLAVE_REG_WRITE_PROC : process( Bus2IP_Clk ) is
variable counter_usec : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (0 to 31) := x"00000000";
variable counter_sec : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (0 to 31);
variable count_100 : integer := 0;
begin
if Bus2IP_Clk’event and Bus2IP_Clk = ’1’ then
if Bus2IP_Reset = ’1’ then
slv_reg0 <= (others => ’0’);
slv_reg1 <= (others => ’0’);
slv_reg2 <= (others => ’0’);
else
case slv_reg_write_sel is
-- If a time index is written to one of the registers from the
-- software, update the clock secs counter with the new value
when "100" =>
-- Read in the time index register to the secs counter
for byte_index in 0 to (C_SLV_DWIDTH/8)-1 loop
if ( Bus2IP_BE(byte_index) = ’1’ ) then
counter_sec(byte_index*8 to byte_index*8+7) :=
Bus2IP_Data(byte_index*8 to byte_index*8+7);
end if;
end loop;
-- If the clock register has not been written to by the
-- software, do the following...
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when others =>
-- If 100 clock cycles have passed, increment usec counter
if (count_100 = 100) then
counter_usec := counter_usec + ’1’;
-- Reset the clock tick counter
count_100 := 0;
-- If a million usecs have passed, increment sec counter
if (counter_usec = 1000000) then
counter_sec := counter_sec + ’1’;
-- Reset the usec counter
counter_usec := x"00000000";
-- Copy the new secs value to the software register
slv_reg0 <= counter_sec;
end if;
-- Copy the new usecs value to the software register
slv_reg1 <= counter_usec;
end if;
-- Increment the clock tick counter
count_100 := count_100 + 1;
end case;
end if;
end if;
end process SLAVE_REG_WRITE_PROC;
To provide the system with a Wireshark-readable time output, the timer con-
tinuously updates two software-accessible 32-bit registers. One register (slv_reg0)
returns an unsigned integer representing the number of seconds since system ini-
tialization or since the last time update. The other register (slv_reg1) returns an
unsigned integer representing the number of microseconds since the timer’s seconds
register was incremented. Note that the timer utilizes the PLB clock, which for this
implementation runs at 100 MHz. Thus, the microsecond counter (counter_usec)
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is incremented by one for every 100 ticks of the bus clock. In addition, the seconds
counter (counter_sec) is incremented by one for every one million ticks of the mi-
croseconds counter. This format matches the Wireshark-standard 64-bit format of a
32-bit unsigned integer for seconds and a 32-bit unsigned integer for microseconds.
To update the system clock with an updated time, the system searches for any
Network Time Protocol (NTP) packets being transmitted on the network. When the
system finds an NTP packet, it extracts the 32-bit seconds portion of the time stamp
and converts it to the Wireshark time format. The software then writes the updated
32-bit seconds value to a designated variable, and sends the 32 bits from the variable
via the PLB to the (counter_sec) register.
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Appendix B. Experimental Data
This Appendix presents the experimental results from the packet processing timetests conducted for the two experiments. Section B.1 contains the data tables
for tests conducted in the first Experiment. Section B.2 contains the data table for
the test conducted in the second Experiment.
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B.1 Results of Testing for the BitTorrent Protocol
B.1.1 Non-BitTorrent Packets. Table B.1 below contains the number of
cycles required to process a non-BitTorrent packet for each of the six configurations
described in the Methodology. For each configuration, 50 packets are sent to the
apparatus and the number of CPU cycles required to process the packet are recorded
in the table.
Table B.1: Processor Cycles Used to Process a Non-BitTorrent Packet
Control User Alerts Packet Write Dual Buffer Cache Optimized
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
1206 1152 1146 1236 276 278
1206 1152 1146 1452 276 329
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B.1.2 Packets with File Info Hash Not On the List. Table B.2 below contains
the number of cycles required to process a BitTorrent Handshake packet whose file
info hash is not on the list of interest, for each of the six configurations described in
the Methodology. For each configuration, 50 packets are sent to the apparatus and
the number of CPU cycles required to process the packet are recorded in the table.
Table B.2: Processor Cycles Used to Process a Packet with a Hash Not On the List
Control User Alerts Packet Write Dual Buffer Cache Optimized
7296 1045329 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043829 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045329 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043829 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045629 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045479 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044429 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043829 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044429 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043679 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045179 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044879 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044129 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045779 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044129 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043529 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045179 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1046079 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043829 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044279 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045629 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043979 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044129 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045329 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044429 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044729 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045179 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045779 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045179 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045929 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045329 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043979 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045479 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043979 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045029 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043979 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043529 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044429 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045479 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044579 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045929 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045029 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044579 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044429 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044429 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045629 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1044429 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1043979 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045029 7593 7770 1145 1205
7296 1045479 7593 7770 1145 1205
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B.1.3 Packets with File Info Hash On the List. Table B.3 below contains
the number of cycles required to process a BitTorrent Handshake packet whose file
info hash is on the list of interest, for each of the six configurations described in the
Methodology. For each configuration, 50 packets are sent to the apparatus and the
number of CPU cycles required to process the packet are recorded in the table.
Table B.3: Processor Cycles Used to Process a Packet with a Hash On the List
Control User Alerts Packet Write Dual Buffer Cache Optimized
104016 1688943 22977 106233 14356 4184
111327 1696977 23607 114813 14216 3773
104016 1690443 22977 106233 13574 3770
124185 1710855 23607 127362 15563 3842
104322 1690026 22977 106539 13613 3770
111633 1697910 23607 115119 14255 3773
104322 1690626 22977 106539 13613 3839
124491 1710588 23607 127668 15527 3773
104628 1689759 22977 106845 13613 3770
111939 1697493 23607 115425 14255 3845
117678 1704441 22977 119628 14819 3740
112245 1697976 23607 115731 14294 3773
104934 1689792 22977 107151 13652 3845
112245 1697976 23607 115731 14294 3773
198645 1787217 22977 200574 22697 3740
112551 1697859 23607 116037 14333 3818
105240 1692075 22977 107457 13691 3740
112551 1698309 23607 116037 14333 3773
118215 1703229 22977 120093 14900 3740
112857 1698192 23607 116343 14372 3812
105546 1691208 22977 107763 13730 3740
112857 1699992 23607 116343 14372 3743
119079 1704264 22977 121086 14978 3809
113163 1700175 23607 116649 14411 3743
105852 1690791 22977 108069 13769 3770
126021 1711203 23607 129198 15599 3812
106158 1691424 22977 108375 13808 3740
113469 1700058 23607 116955 14450 3743
106158 1691874 22977 108375 13808 3815
207222 1794222 23607 210483 22865 3773
106464 1693407 22977 108681 13847 3650
113775 1699791 23607 117261 14489 3848
106464 1693707 22977 108681 13847 3770
126633 1713519 23607 129810 15677 3773
106770 1691640 22977 108987 13886 3770
114081 1699524 23607 117567 14528 3842
120027 1705767 22977 122025 15104 3770
108267 1693011 23607 111753 13787 3773
100956 1686477 22977 103173 13145 3839
108267 1694361 23607 111753 13787 3773
113940 1700628 22977 115821 14348 3770
108573 1694280 23607 112059 13826 3845
101262 1685496 22977 103479 13184 3770
108573 1694430 23607 112059 13826 3773
195387 1782432 22977 197349 21635 3845
108879 1694313 23607 112365 13865 3773
101568 1686129 22977 103785 13223 3770
108879 1694463 23607 112365 13865 3725
114825 1701150 22977 116826 14441 3650
109185 1695846 23607 112671 13904 3653
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B.2 Results of Testing Incorporating BitTorrent and SIP
Table B.4 below contains the number of cycles required to process various Peer-
to-Peer packets using the final apparatus configuration outlined in Appendix A. A
total of 50 packets of each type are sent to the apparatus and the number of CPU
cycles required to process the packet are recorded in the table.
Table B.4: Processor Cycles Used to Process BitTorrent and SIP Packets
Not P2P SIP Not On List SIP INVITE SIP BYE BT Not On List BT Handshake
595 20108 35534 31031 1544 4331
440 19472 34052 29564 1319 3887
389 19421 34862 29513 1319 3884
440 19421 34490 29834 1319 3956
389 19421 34406 30053 1319 3764
440 19421 33929 29804 1319 3767
389 19421 34229 29933 1319 3803
440 19421 34859 29894 1319 3767
389 19421 34787 29573 1319 3764
440 19472 34859 29423 1319 3806
389 19421 34799 29462 1319 3764
440 19472 34790 29663 1319 3767
389 19472 34745 30002 1319 3866
440 19421 34859 29933 1319 3887
389 19421 34790 30002 1319 3884
440 19421 34862 29933 1319 3962
389 19472 34805 30002 1319 3884
440 19421 34790 29933 1319 3887
389 19421 34862 30002 1319 3884
440 19421 34859 29873 1319 3956
389 19472 34736 30002 1319 3884
440 19421 34862 29873 1319 3857
389 19421 34859 30053 1319 3923
440 19421 34790 29933 1319 3857
389 19472 34808 30002 1319 3884
440 19421 34859 29933 1319 3959
389 19421 34790 30053 1319 3884
440 19421 34862 29984 1319 3857
389 19421 34808 30053 1319 3959
440 19472 34790 29984 1319 3887
389 19472 34862 30053 1319 3953
440 19472 34862 29984 1319 3929
389 19421 34736 30053 1319 3884
440 19472 34862 29984 1319 3857
389 19472 34862 30053 1319 3854
440 19472 34790 29984 1319 3926
389 19421 34805 30053 1319 3854
440 19472 34862 29984 1319 3857
389 19421 34790 30053 1319 3923
440 19421 34859 29984 1319 3887
389 19472 34787 30053 1319 3854
440 19421 34859 29984 1319 3929
389 19421 34859 30002 1319 3854
440 19421 34790 29984 1319 3857
389 19421 34856 30053 1319 3929
440 19421 34859 29984 1319 3887
389 19421 34790 30002 1319 3794
440 19421 34862 29984 1319 3932
389 19421 34856 30053 1319 3884
440 19421 34790 29984 1319 3887
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